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IMPACTS OF TRANSITIONING FROM FIRM FIXED PRICE TO 
FIXED PRICE INCENTIVE FIRM TARGET CONTRACTS IN PEO 






The objective of this project is to analyze the impacts to major weapon systems 
programs in Program Executive Office (PEO) Missiles and Space as a result of 
transitioning from firm fixed price (FFP) contracts to fixed price incentive firm target 
(FPIF) contracts. This project presents an in-depth examination of FFP and FPIF contract 
types, including definitions, profit mechanisms, and advantages and disadvantages 
associated with each type. This project reviews three iterations of Better Buying Power, 
with a specific focus on profitability and the use of FPIF contracts. The project presents 
and analyzes data collected through interviews with PEO Missiles and Space program 
management and contracting personnel who support programs that have transitioned from 
FFP to FPIF. The project also examines defense industry profitability and considers the 
perspective of defense contractors regarding Department of Defense profit policy. The 
analysis results indicate that the PEO is appropriately applying guidance for choosing 
FPIF contracts in follow-on production, and that there are both benefits and challenges 
associated with FPIF contracts. Recommendations include continuing to assess FPIF use 
for production programs, obtaining actual cost data, and improving incentive contracting 
workforce training. Further research on the longer-term effects of transitioning to FPIF is 
recommended. 
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The Department of Defense’s (DOD) use of fixed-price-incentive (firm target) 
(FPIF) contracts has been increasing as a result of the advent of the Better Buying Power 
(BBP) initiatives in 2010. The purpose of this project is to examine the impacts to 
selected DOD programs as a result of transitioning to FPIF contracts from another 
contract type, firm-fixed price (FFP). This project will first present and review 
information on various contract types, with particular attention paid to an in-depth 
examination of FFP and FPIF contract types. Then, this project will define these contract 
types, depict acquisition scenarios in which each of these contract types apply, and 
describe the profit mechanism of each type. This project will also delve into advantages 
and disadvantages associated with FFP and FPIF contracts. 
This project will present a literature review of the three iterations of BBP from its 
inception in 2010 through its most current iteration, BBP 3.0, which was promulgated in 
2015. It will examine BBP’s major focus areas and principal actions as they emphasize 
the use of FPIF contracts and relate selection of contract type to aligning profitability 
with DOD acquisition objectives. It also examines defense contractors’ perspectives of 
the BBP initiatives and their opinions on the increasing use of FPIF contracts. 
In order to determine the impacts of the transition in contract type, this project 
will collect data on programs within Program Executive Office (PEO) Missiles and Space 
that have made the change from FFP to FPIF. This data will be gathered through personal 
interviews with subject matter experts within the PEO and the supporting contracting 
activity, including program management personnel and contracting officers. The 
information will be analyzed to determine the conditions that prompted the change in 
contract type. In addition, the information will be evaluated to draw conclusions about 
the benefits and challenges presented by the transition. 
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B. BACKGROUND 
The 1908 airplane contract between the U.S. government and the Wright brothers 
has often been cited as one of the first incentive-type contracts. Under that $25,000 
contract, the Government incentivized performance of the aircraft with the promise of 
extra fee: the Government would pay the Wright brothers an additional $2,500 of fee for 
every mile per hour that the aircraft’s speed exceeded the target of 40 miles per hour.  
The brothers would lose $2,500 of fee for each mile per hour that the aircraft’s speed fell 
short of the target (Hildebrandt, 1998). Although contract types and their applications 
tend to fall in and out of favor as acquisition trends shift, this means the government has 
been using incentive contracts to motivate contractor productivity and performance for 
over a century. In particular, fixed price incentive contracts can be an effective method of 
encouraging contractors to control or reduce costs and improve technical performance by 
providing them the opportunity to share in a percentage of the benefit. 
The 2005 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report DOD Has Paid 
Billions in Award and Incentive Fees Regardless of Acquisition Outcomes found that 
FPIF contracts represented only 0.8% of DOD contracting actions greater than $25,000 in 
fiscal years 1999–2003. More significantly, the GAO also found that some of the FPIF 
contracts it examined significantly overran their projected target costs, fared poorly at 
motivating cost-control behavior, and failed to meet contract performance and schedule 
targets. This GAO report, along with other reports demonstrating inefficiencies in 
government contracting, prompted President Barack Obama in 2009 to issue a 
“Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies” expressing a 
preference for fixed-price type contracts and directed the development of guidance to 
“govern the appropriate use and oversight of all contract types, in full consideration of 
the agency’s needs, and to minimize risk and maximize the value of Government 
contracts” (Obama, 2009). 
One year later, Ashton Carter, then-Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics (USD [AT&L]), issued a memorandum titled “Better Buying 
Power: Mandate for Restoring Affordability and Productivity in Defense Spending,” 
which aimed to improve the way the DOD conducts business and deliver better value for 
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taxpayer dollars. BBP’s overarching objective was to conduct DOD acquisitions more 
efficiently, with the ultimate goal of obtaining “two to three percent net annual growth in 
warfighting capabilities without incurring a commensurate budget increase by identifying 
and eliminating unproductive or low-value-added overhead; in effect, doing more without 
more” (Carter, 2010a, p. 2). As BBP evolved through three iterations over the next five 
years, one of its consistently stated principal actions has been to increase the use of FPIF 
type contracts. 
FPIF contracts are most appropriate in the late development or early production 
stages of an acquisition program’s life cycle. However, the use of FPIF contracts might 
also be indicated during the later stages of the production phase of a program in certain 
circumstances. Although we would generally expect system design, production processes, 
and of course, cost of performance to be well established at this phase of the life cycle, 
leading us to choose FFP contracts during production, this is not always the case. 
Production uncertainties may exist, such as risk due to a diminishing supplier base or 
potential inefficiencies resulting from breaks in production. More often, however, the 
risks are related to cost concerns, such as unreliable cost forecasting, inadequacy of 
proposal audits, and noncompliant contractor systems (Kendall, 2013b). If the cost 
estimating environment is uncertain, such as when examination of actual cost outcomes 
indicates that the contractor significantly underran the negotiated price on the prior FFP 
production increment, an FPIF contract may be appropriate for future production. 
Furthermore, the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement (DFARS) 
Procedures, Guidance and Information (PGI) states that it is not in the best interest of the 
government to use FFP contracts in a production phase when costs for efforts under 
previous FFP production contracts have varied by more than four percent from the costs 
that were negotiated at contract award (2016). All of these scenarios could cause the 
switch from FFP to FPIF. 
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C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
The primary research question addressed in this project is, What are the impacts 
of transitioning defense acquisition programs from firm-fixed price (FFP) type contracts 
to fixed-price incentive (firm target) (FPIF) type contracts? 
Subsidiary research questions include the following: 
 What does existing guidance prescribe regarding circumstances when 
FPIF should be used in lieu of other contract types? 
 Is current guidance appropriately applied when programs shift contract 
type from FFP to FPIF contract types? 
 What benefits has the government realized as a result of the transition 
from FFP to FPIF contracts? 
 What challenges or drawbacks result from the use of FPIF contracts? 
 How do contractors view the DOD’s increased focus on the use of 
incentive contracting? 
D. METHODOLOGY 
This project utilized two primary methodologies to address the research questions. 
Chapters II and IV are based on a literature review. The researchers reviewed current 
regulatory guidance in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), DFARS, and PGI, 
BBP memoranda and implementation guides, and various scholarly articles to develop 
Chapter II, which imparts the background information necessary to understand the major 
contract types being studied and the guidance that is encouraging the transition from FFP 
to FPIF. Chapter IV is based on a literature review of readings conveying various 
corporate perspectives on Better Buying Power and DOD profit policy. 
In order to examine the government perspective on acquisition programs that have 
transitioned from FFP to FPIF, the researchers developed a questionnaire composed of 18 
questions which targeted information related to actual experience with this contract-type 
transition. The questionnaire was delivered through personal communication with 
interview subjects. Chapter III presents and analyzes the questionnaire responses and 
interview results. The interviews were conducted with subject matter experts in 
contracting and program management for PEO Missiles and Space programs. Programs 
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which met the project’s criteria were identified with the assistance of Barry Pike, the 
program executive officer for Missiles and Space. 
E. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
This project examines programs that have changed contract type from FFP to 
FPIF and the effects resulting from that transition. Therefore, this project focuses on 
these two contract types. It will not address fixed price incentive (successive target) 
(FPIS) contract types, nor any cost-type incentive contracts. This project also will not 
investigate programs that have transitioned to FPIF contracts from any contract type other 
than FFP. 
As discussed in the Methodology section, this project presents data gathered and 
analyzed related to weapon system programs in PEO Missiles and Spaces. The data is 
presented in aggregate, and no data or observations are directly attributed to any 
individual program. Programs and contractors are identified only by generic designators 
(e.g., Program A, Contractor 1) in order to avoid disclosure of contractors’ proprietary or 
competition sensitive information. 
This project focuses only on weapon systems under the purview of PEO Missiles 
and Spaces. Initially, we intended to conduct an analysis of a wider variety of programs. 
We surveyed contracting professionals at Army Contracting Command (ACC) -Warren 
who support PEO Ground Combat Systems (GCS) and PEO Combat Support and 
Combat Service Support (CS&CSS). Combined, PEO GCS and PEO CS&CSS are 
comprised of combat weapon systems, tactical wheeled vehicles, and numerous other 
major defense programs. Although we discovered a handful of programs currently 
utilizing FPIF contracts within PEO GCS and PEO CS&CSS, none transitioned from 
previous use of FFP, and therefore did not meet the criteria of the project’s scope. 
F. ORGANIZATION BY CHAPTER 
Chapter II provides a definition and general description of the two broad contract 
types, fixed price and cost reimbursement, as defined in the FAR. In particular, this 
chapter presents an in-depth examination of FFP and FPIF contract types, including their 
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definitions, acquisition scenarios in which these contract types apply, and the operation of 
their profit mechanisms. This chapter also describes advantages and disadvantages 
associated with FFP and FPIF contracts. Finally, this chapter discusses Better Buying 
Power from its inception in 2010 through its most current iteration, BBP 3.0, in relation 
to its emphasis on FPIF contracts. 
Chapter III communicates and synthesizes the data collected during our research. This 
chapter describes the conditions that have motivated programs to switch from FFP to FPIF 
contracts, and describes the perspectives of DOD acquisition professionals on the benefits, 
challenges, and other impacts of transitioning their programs from FFP to FPIF contracts. 
Chapter IV discusses the contractor perspective of DOD’s profit policy resulting 
from the BBP initiative to align profitability of defense acquisition programs more tightly 
with DOD goals. This chapter presents an analysis of defense industry profit margins, the 
potential effects of what contractors perceive to be the DOD’s “war on profit,” and how 
FPIF contracts might address this issue. 
Chapter V presents conclusions and recommendations, as informed by the 
information, literature, and data analyzed in the preceding chapters. This chapter will 
provide the answers to the research questions introduced in Chapter I. Chapter V will also 
impart recommendations related to the application of FPIF contracts and 
recommendations for further research, particularly related to the longer-term effects of 
transitioning from FFP to FPIF contracts. 
G. BENEFITS OF STUDY 
Overall, this project aims to assist PEO Missiles and Space in determining the 
benefits achieved and challenges faced as programs move from FFP to FPIF. This project 
will assist other weapon system programs that are contemplating a similar transition to 
understand the positive and negative effects that may result from the switch to FPIF. This 
project also examines the appropriate circumstances for application of FPIF contracts and 
observes whether the studied programs are employing the FPIF contract type 
appropriately. Furthermore, the results of this study may help inform and refine guidance 
in future iterations, if any, of Better Buying Power. 
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II. CONTRACT TYPE AND BETTER BUYING POWER 
A. INTRODUCTION OF CONTRACT TYPE 
There are numerous contract types available to the Procuring Contracting Officer 
(PCO) that he or she can employ in the procurement of goods and services for the 
government. At the highest level, selection of contract type is about risk and reward. 
First, the most appropriate contract type for an effort must consider the degree of risk that 
the government and the contractor each have to bear and what is a reasonable balance 
between the parties. Second, with regard to reward, the contract type should be chosen 
with the purpose of motivating the contractor by providing a profit incentive for 
economical and efficient performance in achieving or exceeding the requirements of the 
contract (Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & 
Logistics [OUSD (AT&L)], 2016). 
1. Fixed-Price and Cost-Reimbursement Contracts 
There are two overarching contract types: fixed-price and cost-reimbursement. 
Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) (2016) § 16.201 broadly defines fixed-price 
contracts as contracts that “provide for a firm price or, in appropriate cases, an adjustable 
price.” On the other hand, per FAR (2016) § 16.301-1, cost-reimbursement type contracts 
“provide for payment of allowable incurred costs, to the extent prescribed in the contract” 
and “establish an estimate of total cost for the purpose of obligating funds.” This FAR 
section further indicates that the contractor may not incur costs above the ceiling price 
estimate without obtaining approval from the PCO. Cost-reimbursement type contracts 
are appropriate in circumstances in which the contract requirements are not well-enough 
defined to facilitate the use of a fixed-price contract, including procurements for research 
and development (R&D), and during the early phases of the acquisition life cycle (i.e., 
Technology Demonstration [TD], Engineering and Manufacturing Development [EMD] 
and Low Rate Initial Production [LRIP]). Figure 1 depicts contract type and cost risk 




 Cost Risk and Contract Type Relative to Acquisition Life Cycle and Figure 1. 
Requirements Definition. Source: Defense Acquisition University 
(2012). 
The relative risk assumed by the government and the contractor, respectively, 
varies across the spectrum of contract types. At the cost-plus-fixed-fee end of the 
continuum, the government assumes the risk of cost and performance of the contractor. 
At the other end, the contractor assumes the majority of the risk under firm-fixed price 
contracts, where the contractor assumes complete responsibility for the cost of 
performance and the profit or loss that results (OUSD [AT&L], 2016). Figure 2 includes 
several sub-types under each of the two broad contract categories of fixed-price and cost-
reimbursement.  Fixed-price contract types include 
 Firm-Fixed Price (FFP) 
 Fixed-Price Contracts with Economic Price Adjustment (FPEA) 
 Fixed-Price Contracts with Price Redetermination (FPR) 
 Fixed-Price Incentive (Successive Target) (FPIS)  
 Fixed-Price Incentive (Firm Target) (FPIF) 
Likewise, cost-reimbursement type contracts can be further subdivided into more 
specific subtypes, including 
 Cost Sharing 
 Cost-Plus-Incentive-Fee (CPIF) 
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 Cost-Plus-Award-Fee (CPAF) 
 Cost Contracts where the contractor receives no fee 
 Cost-Plus-Fixed-Fee (CPFF) 
Figure 2 depicts the risk assumed by the government and the contractor, with the 
contractor assuming maximum risk under an FFP contract at the upper left of the figure 
and the government assuming maximum risk under a CPFF contract in the lower right 
corner. The amount of risk assumed by the contractor decreases as the continuum of 
contract types is traversed. This can also be stated as the amount of risk transferred to the 
government increases as the spectrum moves from FFP to CPFF.  
 
 Government and Contractor Risk Assumption by Contract Type. Figure 2. 
Source: Cuskey (2015). 
2. Factors in the Selection of Contract Type 
Selection of contract type is a complex matter and depends on numerous 
considerations. FAR (2016) § 16.104 lists 12 factors that the PCO should consider in the 
selection and negotiation of contract type: 
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(a) Price competition. Normally, effective price competition results in 
realistic pricing, and a fixed-price contract is ordinarily in the 
Government’s interest. 
(b) Price analysis. Price analysis, with or without competition, may 
provide a basis for selecting the contract type. The degree to which price 
analysis can provide a realistic pricing standard should be carefully 
considered. (See 15.404-1(b)) 
(c) Cost analysis. In the absence of effective price competition and if price 
analysis is not sufficient, the cost estimates of the offeror and the 
Government provide the bases for negotiating contract pricing 
arrangements. It is essential that the uncertainties involved in performance 
and their possible impact upon costs be identified and evaluated, so that a 
contract type that places a reasonable degree of cost responsibility upon 
the contractor can be negotiated. 
(d) Type and complexity of the requirement. Complex requirements, 
particularly those unique to the Government, usually result in greater risk 
assumption by the Government. This is especially true for complex 
research and development contracts, when performance uncertainties or 
the likelihood of changes makes it difficult to estimate performance costs 
in advance. As a requirement recurs or as quantity production begins, the 
cost risk should shift to the contractor, and a fixed-price contract should be 
considered. 
(e) Combining contract types. If the entire contract cannot be firm-fixed-
price, the contracting officer shall consider whether or not a portion of the 
contract can be established on a firm-fixed-price basis. 
(f) Urgency of the requirement. If urgency is a primary factor, the 
Government may choose to assume a greater proportion of risk or it may 
offer incentives tailored to performance outcomes to ensure timely 
contract performance. 
(g) Period of performance or length of production run. In times of 
economic uncertainty, contracts extending over a relatively long period 
may require economic price adjustment or price redetermination clauses. 
(h) Contractor’s technical capability and financial responsibility. 
(i) Adequacy of the contractor’s accounting system. Before agreeing on a 
contract type other than firm-fixed-price, the contracting officer shall 
ensure that the contractor’s accounting system will permit timely 
development of all necessary cost data in the form required by the 
proposed contract type. This factor may be critical— 
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(1) When the contract type requires price revision while 
performance is in progress; or 
(2) When a cost- reimbursement contract is being considered and 
all current or past experience with the contractor has been on a fixed-price 
basis. See 42.302(a)(12). 
(j) Concurrent contracts. If performance under the proposed contract 
involves concurrent operations under other contracts, the impact of those 
contracts, including their pricing arrangements, should be considered. 
(k) Extent and nature of proposed subcontracting. If the contractor 
proposes extensive subcontracting, a contract type reflecting the actual 
risks to the prime contractor should be selected. 
(l) Acquisition history. Contractor risk usually decreases as the 
requirement is repetitively acquired. Also, product descriptions or 
descriptions of services to be performed can be defined more clearly.  
The list of considerations in the FAR is not all-inclusive, but it clearly illustrates 
that the choice of contract type requires careful thought and analysis of the procurement 
facts. As previously discussed, a full complement of fixed-price and cost-reimbursement 
contract types is available to the PCO to fit various acquisition scenarios. This paper 
focuses on two particular fixed-price contract types, firm-fixed price (FFP) and fixed-
price incentive (firm target) (FPIF). An in-depth discussion of each follows in the next 
two sections. 
B. FIRM-FIXED PRICE CONTRACTS 
The following section defines the FFP contract type and discusses conditions 
where the FFP contract type is appropriate.  This section also uses a hypothetical scenario 
of contract price and cost to explain the FFP profit mechanism, including a depiction of 
the slope of an FFP profit line.  Finally, this section identifies some advantages and 
disadvantages associated with the FFP contract type. 
1. Definition and Application 
FAR (2016) § 16.202 defines an FFP contract as a contract whose price is not 
subject to any adjustment as a result of the contractor’s incurred costs during its 
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performance of the contract. This section further explains that an FFP contract places 
maximum cost risk and responsibility, as well as the resulting profit (or loss) on the 
contractor. Regardless of the actual costs experienced by the contractor, an FFP contract 
obligates the contractor to provide the contracted supplies or services at the time, place, 
price, and quality level specified in the contract (Defense Acquisition University, 2012). 
FAR (2016) § 16.202-2 discusses the application of FFP contracts and the 
circumstances in which their use is appropriate. FFP contracts are suitable for procuring 
commercial items—indeed, a fixed price type contract must be used when acquiring 
commercial supplies or services, as FAR (2016) § 16.301-3(b) prohibits the use of cost-
type contracts to acquire commercial items. Volume 4 of Defense Acquisition 
University’s (DAU) Contract Pricing Reference Guide gives further conditions where the 
use of an FFP contract would be appropriate, including 
 A well-defined requirement, 
 A requirement that prospective contractors are skilled and experienced in 
accomplishing, 
 Stable market conditions, and 
 Financial risks to the government and contractor are otherwise 
insignificant (Defense Acquisition University, 2012). 
Above all, one of the most important considerations in selecting an FFP contract 
is whether the contracting officer is able to establish fair and reasonable contract prices at 
the time of contract award, since the prices will not be subject to any subsequent 
adjustment as a result of contract performance. FAR (2016) § 16.202-2 details several 
possible pricing scenarios where the contracting officer can confidently establish FFP 
contract pricing, including 
 Adequate price competition. In general, FAR (2016) § 15.403-1(c)(1) 
defines adequate price competition as existing when “Two or more 
responsible offerors, competing independently, submit priced offers that 
satisfy the Government’s expressed requirement.”  
 Previous procurement history exists for the same or similar items where 
price reasonableness was supported by either adequate price competition 
or certified cost or pricing data. 
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 Cost or pricing information is available to permit the parties to reasonably 
estimate the probable costs of contract performance. 
 The government can identify potential performance uncertainties and the 
parties can reasonably estimate the cost impact of those uncertainties, such 
that the contractor is willing to assume the risks involved and accept an 
FFP contract.  
2. Profit Mechanism 
This section examines the behavior of the profit mechanism under an FFP 
contract. The definition of an FFP contract in the previous section establishes that the 
contract price paid to the contractor for performance of the contract does not change 
regardless of the actual costs the contractor incurs to provide a deliverable in accordance 
with the agreed-upon terms of the contract (FAR [2016] § 16.202-1). This means that for 
every dollar of cost the contractor saves, it gains an extra dollar of profit. Conversely, for 
every dollar of cost incurred over its estimate to perform the contract, the contractor loses 
a dollar of profit. The amount of profit is limited only by the contract price. The amount 
of loss is theoretically unlimited. 
Figure 3 depicts the actual cost, realized profit dollars, total price, and effective 
profit rate for four cost scenarios under a hypothetical FFP contract. The scenarios 
assume that the contract was awarded at a firm-fixed price of $115, with an estimated 
cost of $100 and estimated profit of $15, or 15%. In the first scenario, the contractor’s 
actual costs are equal to its original estimated costs, resulting in realized profit and an 
effective profit rate also equal to its original estimates. In the second scenario, the 
contractor performed more efficiently than originally anticipated and was able to achieve 
$10 in cost savings as compared to its original estimate, which results in a $10 increase in 
profit. The contractor’s actual cost is equal to the contract price in the third scenario, 
resulting in zero profit dollars. Finally, the fourth scenario shows a contractor loss 
situation. The contractor experienced a cost overrun of $30, which results in a dollar-for-
dollar decrease to the contractor’s profit. Because the original estimated profit was $15, 
this means the contractor experiences a loss of $15. 
 14 
 
 Four Cost and Profit Scenarios under a Hypothetical FFP Contract Figure 3. 
The ratio of realized profit relative to actual cost is graphically represented in 
Figure 4. 
 
 Linear Representation of Realized Profit Relative to Actual Cost Figure 4. 
under a Hypothetical FFP Contract 
3. Advantages and Disadvantages of FFP Type Contracts 
All contract types have advantages and disadvantages depending on the 










Actual Cost = Estimated Cost 100$           15$             115$           15.0%
Actual Cost < Estimated Cost 90$             25$             115$           27.8%
Actual Cost = Firm Fixed Price 115$           $              0 115$           0.0%
Actual Cost > Estimated Cost 130$           (15)$           115$           -11.5%
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is tempting to think that FFP type contracts are mainly advantageous for the government 
because the contractor bears the risk and responsibility of the incurred costs of 
performance and the profit or loss it experiences as a result. The DAU Contract Pricing 
Reference Guide even states that the “Principal Risk to be Mitigated” of FFP contracts is 
“None. Thus, the contractor assumes all cost risk” (2012, Vol. 4, pp. 2-3) in their 
Comparison of Major Contract Types. However, this is a rather narrow view. We must 
consider all aspects of an acquisition to fully assess the advantages and disadvantages of 
FFP type contracts. 
a. Advantages of FFP Type Contracts 
This section discusses several advantages associated with FFP contracts, 
including the contractor’s incentive to control costs, certainty of the contract price, less 
contract administration, and less burdensome accounting system requirements. 
(1) Incentive to Control Costs 
FFP places maximum incentive on contractors to control costs. The contractor 
experiences a dollar-for-dollar benefit to its bottom line by improving efficiency and 
controlling the cost of performance. FFP contracts provide more motivation to the 
contractor to implement cost control measures than any other contract type, because it 
allows the contractor to keep the entire benefit of its cost reductions (as opposed to other 
contract types further down the spectrum where the contractor has to share the benefit of 
cost savings with the government). 
(2) Price Certainty 
FFP contracts have the advantage, by their very definition, of having a fixed 
contract price, regardless of contractor cost. The contractor can underrun or overrun its 
cost of performing the contract, but the price to the government does not change. This 
price certainty is especially desirable in times of diminishing budgets (Frick, 2013). It is 
very beneficial to the government to know exactly what it will pay for the supplies and 
services for which it has contracted, and that no further outlay will be required on the 
contract than what is already known. FFP contracts are the only contract type that has this 
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trait. Cost-reimbursement contracts and all other fixed-price type contracts include the 
potential for future price redetermination. 
(3) Less Contract Administration 
Per FAR (2016) § 16.202-1, FFP contracts create a minimum administrative 
burden upon the government. Under an FFP contract, the government is not required to 
monitor the contractor’s cost of performance as it must under a cost-reimbursement or 
fixed-price incentive type contract. There is no need to track the contractor’s progress 
toward meeting performance or schedule incentives. The contracting officer does not 
have to exercise surveillance over the number of labor hours the contractor is working 
under a service contract – the contractor is obliged to perform the service to the 
specification in the contract’s scope of work regardless of the number of hours it actually 
requires to accomplish. Eliminating the government’s responsibility to monitor contractor 
cost and performance reduces administrative burden as well as procurement cost to the 
government (Coombs, 2013). 
(4) Adequate Accounting System Not Required 
A firm-fixed price contract does not require the contractor to have an adequate 
accounting system. However, for any other contract type, the PCO must confirm that the 
contractor has an accounting system that “will permit timely development of all 
necessary cost data in the form required by the proposed contract type” (FAR [2016] § 
16.104(i)). Adequate contractor accounting systems are required for fixed-price incentive, 
fixed-price redetermination, and all cost-reimbursement type contracts. Ensuring the 
adequacy of a contractor’s accounting system is no small task. The PCO typically does 
not have the accounting expertise to perform the accounting system review himself and 
therefore delegates the cognizant Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA) field audit 
office to audit the contractor’s accounting system. DCAA will perform an accounting 
system audit and provide findings to the PCO to support the PCO’s adequacy 
determination. 
Establishing and maintaining an adequate accounting system can be onerous for 
the contractor, as well. DFARS (2016) § 252.242-7006, Accounting System 
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Administration, prescribes 18 criteria that the contractor’s accounting system must meet. 
These criteria mainly focus on appropriate internal controls, and the system’s ability to 
segregate costs by type, contract, and cost objective. The criteria also require the 
contractor to maintain accounting practices in accordance with the Cost Accounting 
Standards (CAS) Board. Administering an accounting system that meets all 18 criteria is 
a complex and expensive endeavor. Even some of the largest and most experienced 
defense contractors find it difficult to maintain an adequate accounting system. 
b. Disadvantages of FFP Type Contracts 
This section identifies several disadvantages associated with FFP contracts.  FFP 
contracts may present risks associated with price premiums, contractor cost of 
performance, and unclear requirements definition.  FFP contracts also lack flexibility 
when requirements change.  In addition, FFP contracts are not appropriate for R&D type 
efforts. 
(1) Price Premium Risk 
Although it is true that the government will not pay more than the negotiated 
contracted price under an FFP contract, it would be short-sighted to assume this means 
there is no cost risk to the government. A sensible contractor will consider the likelihood 
that its actual cost of performance may differ from the estimated cost of performance and 
price some uncertainty into its proposed price. Although some FFP contracts will require 
an in-depth analysis of certified cost or pricing data, there exists a real possibility that the 
government will pay an unknown price premium under an FFP contract to mitigate the 
contractor’s cost risk. Some opinions estimate that larger fixed-price contracts likely 
include a 10 to 15 percent price premium to help the contractor manage its cost risk 
(Frick, 2013). 
(2) Contractor Cost Risk 
An FFP contract shifts maximum cost risk to the contractor. The government will 
never pay more than the contracted price regardless of what costs the contractor actually 
incurs. Therefore, the cost risk to the contractor is theoretically limitless. A contractor 
who is experiencing large cost overruns may eventually become unable to perform the 
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contract, potentially resulting in the government terminating the contract for default. A 
substantial loss could weaken the contractor’s overall financial performance and 
negatively affect its corporate stock prices. If the loss were severe enough, it could even 
bankrupt the contractor, further resulting in the decline of the DOD’s industrial base.  
Additionally, because contractors bear the maximum burden of cost risk under 
FFP contracts, this contract type has the potential to exclude small and medium-sized 
businesses who cannot afford to bear cost risk because of their more limited financial 
resources (Defense Business Board, 2010). This could have the unintended consequences 
of inhibiting competition and small business participation for government contracts. The 
competition for the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) EMD contract is one such 
example. The EMD phase of the JLTV program required vehicle and trailer prototypes, 
systems engineering, and substantial test support. This FFP effort was solicited under full 
and open competition with the intent to award up to three contracts. Notably, the 
solicitation cautioned bidders that proposals priced in excess of $65 million would be 
considered unaffordable, which could be grounds for rejection from the competition 
(Feickert, 2016). This was despite some internal government cost estimates that indicated 
the effort could not be fully performed within this affordability ceiling. In addition, the 
DOD’s FY 2012 Budget Request for $243.9 million (Department of Defense [DOD], 
2011) indicates that the Joint Program Office believed it needed more funding - $243.9 
million divided among three contracts equates to approximately $81 million per contract, 
$16 million in excess of the $65 million affordability cap. When the solicitation closed, 
offers from seven bidders were received—six from huge defense contractors such as 
Lockheed Martin and BAE Systems, and only one from a small business, Hardwire, LLC. 
(Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, n.d.). It is not surprising that there was not more interest 
from small businesses, as any overrun on an FFP contract is the sole responsibility of the 
contractor. While $16 million might be considered a rounding error to a multi-billion 
dollar company, it would be a substantial—potentially bankrupting—overrun for a small 
business to absorb. 
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(3) Risk of Unclear Requirements Definition 
It is essential that an FFP contract very clearly define the requirements that the 
contractor is obligated to meet. If requirements are poorly defined, it is possible that the 
contractor may perform the work as specified in the contract, but the resulting supply or 
service may not meet the government’s need because the government adequately define 
its requirement in the contract’s statement of work (Garrett, 2009). Vague contract 
language, or ambiguity, leaves the government exposed to the risk that the contractor will 
adopt an interpretation that allows it to meet the letter of the contract at the minimum 
effort required, resulting in a level of performance lower than that which was desired by 
the government. Any ambiguity will be interpreted against the government, as per the 
concept of contra proferentem, which states that any contract ambiguities shall be 
interpreted against the drafter—that is, against the government (Contract and Fiscal Law 
Department, The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School, 2014). As long as 
its interpretation of the requirement is reasonable, the ambiguity will be interpreted in the 
contractor’s favor, potentially resulting in a deliverable that is less than what the 
government desired but is still in accordance with the contract. 
(4) Lack of Flexibility in Changing Requirements 
In addition to ambiguous requirements, changing requirements can also inhibit the 
government from efficiently administering FFP contracts. If a program experiences an 
unanticipated growth or decline in its requirements, an FFP contract is not flexible 
enough to respond without modification (Coombs, 2013). Modifications, as well as 
partial or full terminations for convenience, resulting from post-award requirements 
changes add to the government’s administrative and cost burden. 
(5) Not Appropriate for Developmental Efforts 
FFP contracts are appropriate in circumstances where the government’s 
requirement is well-defined and costs can be estimated with reasonable accuracy at the 
time of contract award. By their very nature, R&D type efforts generally do not meet 
these criteria. Some R&D efforts for major weapon systems may include validating 
design approaches, refining requirements, developing prototypes, and integrating systems 
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and subsystems (DOD, 2013). These types of efforts inevitably lead to changes in 
requirements, which further create uncertainty in pricing. FAR (2016) § 35.006 states that 
“the absence of precise specifications and difficulties in estimating costs with accuracy 
(resulting in a lack of confidence in cost estimates) normally precludes using fixed-price 
contracting for R&D.”  
Historically, attempts to use FFP contracts for the development of major weapon 
systems have been dismal failures, resulting in program cost growth, restructuring and 
cancellation; contractors bearing hundreds of millions of dollars of cost overruns; and 
lengthy and expensive litigation (Defense Business Board, 2010). One such case is the 
Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile (AMRAAM) program. The Air Force’s 
acquisition strategy to competitively award an FFP contract, as well as “overly optimistic 
estimates of the complexity and cost of the missile,” resulted in numerous schedule 
delays, unmet technical performance requirements, and the absorption of $255 million in 
losses related to cost overruns by the contractor, Hughes Aircraft Company (Government 
Accountability Office, 1987, p. 17). 
The services also used FFP contracts for numerous aircraft development programs 
in the mid-1980s, including the V-22, F-14D, T-45, T-46, and C-17, all of which suffered 
cost, schedule, and performance difficulties correlated to the use of FFP contracts for 
developmental efforts (Defense Business Board, 2010). The most notorious, however, 
was the Navy’s FFP development of the A-12 aircraft. The A-12 Avenger II was a stealth 
aircraft with unproven technology, and its development was plagued with schedule woes, 
technical concerns, and cost overruns in excess of $1 billion. The contractors, General 
Dynamics and McDonnell Douglas (later acquired by Boeing), maintained the FFP 
contract was flawed, stating, “The outline of the work was such that it required 
considerable more effort, more technology and more investment than had been originally 
specified” (Schmitt, 1991, para. 19). The Navy’s remedy was to terminate the contract for 
default and demand $1.3 billion in restitution. This action resulted in 23 years of arguing 
legal battles with contractors and countless millions of taxpayer dollars spent on 
litigation. The A-12 was never built, and the government ended up with only $400 
 21 
million in hardware and program discounts in compensation instead of the more than $1 
billion incurred in cost overruns (Thompson, 2014). 
C. FIXED-PRICE INCENTIVE (FIRM TARGET) CONTRACTS 
FAR (2016) § 16.204 defines a fixed-price-incentive contract as “a fixed-price 
contract that provides for adjusting profit and establishing the final contract price by a 
formula based on the relationship of final negotiated total cost to total target cost.” There 
are two types of fixed-price incentive contracts: fixed-price-incentive (firm target) (FPIF) 
and fixed-price-incentive successive targets (FPIS). FPIS-type contracts are outside the 
scope of this research paper and will not be discussed further. The following section 
describes FPIF contracts, their applications, profit mechanism, and advantages and 
disadvantages in further detail. 
1. Definition and Application 
FAR (2016) § 16.403-1(a) defines FPIF contracts as a contract type that 
specifies a target cost, a target profit, a price ceiling (but not a profit 
ceiling or floor), and a profit adjustment formula. These elements are all 
negotiated at the outset. The price ceiling is the maximum that may be 
paid to the contractor, except for any adjustment under other contract 
clauses. When the contractor completes performance, the parties negotiate 
the final cost, and the final price is established by applying the formula. 
When the final cost is less than the target cost, application of the formula 
results in a final profit greater than the target profit; conversely, when final 
cost is more than target cost, application of the formula results in a final 
profit less than the target profit, or even a net loss. If the final negotiated 
cost exceeds the price ceiling, the contractor absorbs the difference as a 
loss.  
DAU’s Contract Pricing Reference Guide, Volume 4, states that FPIF contracts 
should be used when the parties can establish a ceiling price that sufficiently covers the 
most likely risks inherent in contract performance, as well as a profit sharing ratio that 
adequately incentivizes the contractor to control the costs it incurs to achieve contract 
performance objectives. The Guide further states that the “contractor is obliged to 
provide an acceptable deliverable” (2012, Vol. 4, pp. 3-4) in accordance with the contract 
 22 
schedule and scope of work, for which it will be paid at or below the ceiling price 
commensurate with costs incurred.  
FAR (2016) § 16.403 discusses the general application of FPIF contracts, and the 
DFARS and DFARS Procedures, Guidance and Information (PGI) give more specifics 
about circumstances in which use of FPIF contracts is appropriate. Broadly, FPIF 
contracts are appropriate in circumstances where an FFP contract would not be suitable, 
and when the contractor’s assumption of cost responsibility provides a positive incentive 
to control contract cost and performance through the opportunity for increased profit 
margins. Although the contract’s final price is not determinable at contract award, 
contract requirements and cost of performance must be certain enough that the parties can 
negotiate all FPIF elements at the outset, including target cost, target profit, ceiling price, 
and the share ratios for cost underruns and overruns. This means that in many cases, FPIF 
will not be appropriate for programs in the TD phase or even the EMD phases of their life 
cycle, when many of the program efforts will be of an R&D nature. History shows that 
over the last two decades, the average Major Defense Acquisition Program (MDAP) 
experienced cost overruns of nearly 30 percent during EMD (Kendall, 2013b). This 
degree of cost uncertainty is too high to expect the contractor to bear or share. However, 
Kendall believes there can be limited situations in which FPIF can be appropriate 
employed in the EMD phase. If an MDAP’s requirements are stable and mature, 
technical risk is low, and the competing contractors are both experienced and financially 
solvent enough to absorb cost overruns, an FPIF contract type may be a reasonable 
choice during EMD (2013b). 
DFARS (2016) § 216.403-1(b)(1) directs contracting officers to give particular 
consideration to using an FPIF contract when a program is moving from development to 
the production phase of its life cycle. Kendall states that FPIF becomes a more natural fit 
as an MDAP enters low-rate initial production (LRIP). Like MDAPs during EMD, over 
the last 20 years, MDAPs during LRIP have experienced cost overruns. However, the 
historical average LRIP overrun is slightly less than ten percent. Kendall put forward that 
this is a reasonable level at which to expect contractors and the government to share cost 
risk by using an FPIF contract type (Kendall, 2013b). 
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Finally, Kendall states that FPIF contracts may be appropriate in certain MDAPs 
during full-rate production (FRP) (2013b). Although we would typically expect 
requirements and cost of performance to be certain enough to utilize an FFP-type 
contract, in some instances, FPIF may actually be a better fit. Sometimes, production 
parameters may be uncertain, such as the potential for inefficiencies resulting from 
breaks in production or risk due to a diminishing supplier base. More often, the risks are 
related to cost concerns, such as inadequate proposal audits, noncompliant contractor 
accounting and estimating systems, and unreliable cost forecasting (Kendall, 2013b). If 
the cost estimating environment is uncertain, such as when examination of actual cost 
outcomes indicates that the contractor significantly underran the negotiated price on the 
prior production increment, an FPIF contract may be advisable for a future increment. 
Definitively, DFARS PGI 216.403-1(1)(ii)(B) states that it is not in the best interest of 
the government to use FFP contracts in a production phase if costs are not stable, a 
circumstance further defined as potentially occurring when costs for efforts under 
previous FFP production contracts have varied by more than four percent from the costs 
that were negotiated at contract award (2016). 
2. Profit Mechanism 
This section examines the behavior of the profit mechanism under an FPIF 
contract. The definition of an FPIF contract in the previous section establishes that the 
contract price paid to the contractor for performance of the contract will depend on the 
contractor’s actual cost of performance in relation to the incentive parameters established 
at contract award, including target cost, target profit, ceiling price, and share ratio. In 
order to demonstrate how profit and final contract price are calculated, we must first 
define these terms. 
 Target Cost: The target cost represents what the government and 
contractor agree at the outset is the most likely estimate of the total cost of 
contract performance. 
 Target Profit: The target profit is the negotiated reasonable rate of return, 
and represents the profit the contractor will earn if the actual cost of 
contract performance equals the target cost. 
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 Ceiling Price: The contract’s ceiling price represents the maximum price 
paid to the contractor, regardless of actual costs incurred for contract 
performance. The government may pay less, but will never pay more than 
the contract’s ceiling price. All cost overruns above the ceiling price are 
the obligation of the contractor. 
 Share Ratio: The share ratio represents the proportion of cost overrun or 
underrun above or below the target cost to be allocated between the 
government and the contractor. The government share is always the first 
number expressed in the ratio, and the contractor share is represented by 
the second number (OUSD [AT&L], 2016). For example, in a 60/40 share 
ratio, the government shares 60% of an overrun, while the contractor 
shares 40% of that overrun. 
Figure 5 depicts the actual cost, target profit, share of underrun or overrun, actual 
profit, and effective profit rate for four cost scenarios under a hypothetical FPIF contract. 
The scenarios assume that the contract was awarded at a target cost of $100, with a target 
profit of $15 and a ceiling price of $120. This simple example assumes a 50/50 
government/contractor share ratio for both cost overruns and cost underruns. This scenario is 
purposely simple for the purposes of illustrating the FPIF profit mechanism. In reality, an 
FPIF contract may be far more complex than this example. The parties may negotiate 
different share ratios for cost underruns and cost overruns – for example, 40/60 for underruns 
and 70/30 for overruns. Furthermore, per FAR (2016) § 16.402, the parties may also agree to 
multiple incentives in addition to cost, such as incentivizing certain technical performance 
objectives or delivery schedule. Multiple incentive arrangements are permissible as long as 
cost is incentivized and the multiple-incentive arrangement motivates the contractor to strive 
for excellent results in all incentivized areas. These scenarios add complexities that are 
outside the scope of this example. 
In the first scenario, the contractor’s actual costs are equal to the original 
negotiated target costs, resulting in realized profit equal to the target profit. The 
contractor performed more efficiently than originally anticipated in the second scenario, 
resulting in a $10 cost underrun as compared to the target cost; a 50% share of this 
underrun is $5, which results in $20 of actual profit ($15 target profit + $5 share of cost 
underrun). In the third scenario, the contractor experienced a $10 cost overrun compared 
to the target cost but its actual cost is less than the ceiling price. A 50% share of this 
overrun is $5, which results in $10 of actual profit ($15 target profit - $5 share of cost 
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overrun). Finally, the fourth scenario depicts a situation in which the actual cost of 
contract performance exceeded the ceiling price. The contractor experienced a cost 
overrun of $30; 50% of this overrun is $15. Following the mathematics of the previous 
examples, we might assume this means the contractor has an actual profit of $0 ($15 
target profit - $15 share of cost overrun). However, the contractor is limited to receiving 
no more than the contract’s ceiling price. This means the contractor experiences a loss of 
$10 ($120 ceiling price - $130 actual cost). 
 
 Four Cost and Profit Scenarios under a Hypothetical FPIF Contract Figure 5. 
The ratio of realized profit relative to actual cost is graphically represented in 
Figure 6. 
 
 Linear Representation of Realized Profit Relative to Actual Cost Figure 6. 















Actual Cost = Target Cost 100$           15$             -$           15$             115$           15.0%
Actual Cost < Target Cost 90$             15$             5$               20$             110$           22.2%
Target Cost > Actual Cost > Ceiling Price 110$           15$             (5)$             10$             120$           9.1%
Actual Cost > Ceiling Price 130$           15$             (15)$           (10)$           120$           -7.7%
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3. Advantages and Disadvantages of FPIF Type Contracts 
Just as with FFP contracts, there are also a number of advantages and 
disadvantages associated with the use of FPIF contracts.  Contracting professionals must 
weigh these aspects carefully when deciding if FPIF is appropriate. 
a. Advantages of FPIF Type Contracts 
This section discusses several advantages associated with FPIF contracts.  The 
primary advantage is the sharing of risk and rewards between the government and 
contractor to incentivize effective contract performance.  FPIF contracts also require less 
precision about contract costs at the time of award than FFP contracts require.  In 
addition, FPIF contracts offer greater flexibility than FFP contracts. 
(1) Sharing of Risk and Rewards 
A well-structured FPIF arrangement allows the contractor the opportunity to 
control cost and performance to maximize its profit margin, and for the government to 
obtain benefits as well. The use of FPIF contracts allows for the risk of contract 
performance to be shared more equitably between the government and the contractor than 
does an FFP-type contract. Under an FFP contract, the contractor bears the entire risk of 
cost overruns. Under an FPIF contract, the interplay of the elements of target cost, ceiling 
price, and share ratio allow for the parties to share any cost overruns above the target cost 
up to the ceiling price. Likewise, when the cost of performance is lower than the target 
cost, the share ratio allows the government to benefit from a share of the cost savings. 
(2) Requires Less Precision about Contract Cost of Performance at the Outset 
The applications of FPIF contracts as described previously are inherently 
conditions in which some cost uncertainty exists. We are less able to accurately estimate 
the final cost and price of contract performance such that the use of an FFP contract is not 
appropriate. Although we should feel a reasonable degree of confidence in estimating the 
target cost and ceiling price of an FPIF contract, the target cost represents just a single 
point in the range of possible actual costs (OUSD [AT&L], 2016). The establishment of 
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the ceiling price and the share ratio account for the potential variations and risk in the 
contractor’s actual cost of performance. 
(3) Flexibility 
An FPIF-type contract can give the government and the contractor some 
flexibility that is lacking under an FFP contract. By its very nature, an FPIF contract is 
meant to give the contractor the flexibility to manage and make tradeoffs between cost 
and performance, and help both parties to control cost growth and mitigate schedule 
delays (OUSD [AT&L], 2016). The contractor may be more flexible and amenable to 
contract changes when it is firmly in a cost underrun situation. It is also possible that the 
parties may be able to negotiate small changes to the contract’s requirements or delivery 
schedule by negotiating a change to the incentive share ratio without the need to 
renegotiate the FPIF target cost and ceiling price. 
b. Disadvantages of FPIF Contracts 
This section identifies several disadvantages associated with FPIF contracts.  
FPIF contracts are more complex than FFP contracts to price, analyze, and negotiate. 
FPIF contracts require the contractor to deploy more complicated accounting and earned 
value management systems to track actual contract costs; these systems lead to increased 
efforts by the Government to administer FPIF type contracts. However, the Government 
workforce lacks experience with such administration. 
(1) Complexity 
FPIF contracts are more complex than FFP contracts. FPIF contracts require the 
parties to develop and negotiate more cost parameters than if they were to employ an FFP 
contract. Developing target cost, ceiling price, and the government/ contractor share 
ratios requires more intensive cost analysis. The ability to use multiple share ratios (i.e., a 
different share ratio for cost underruns and another for cost overruns) and the potential 
for using non-cost incentives to motivate objective performance or schedule parameters 
further adds to the complexity of FPIF contracts. The contractor’s need to balance cost, 
schedule, and performance, especially in the presence of multiple incentives, also adds 
complexity during contract execution. 
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(2) Contractor System Requirements 
FPIF contracts require the contractor to establish and maintain more systems than 
would be required under an FFP contract. FAR (2016) § 16.403-1(c)(1) limits the use of 
FPIF by requiring the contractor to have an accounting system that is adequate for 
providing data in support of negotiating revisions to the incentive price as well as the 
final contract cost and price. As previously discussed, administering an accounting 
system that is CAS compliant and meets all the DFARS criteria for adequacy is 
expensive and complex for the contractor. 
In addition, the use of an Earned Value Management System (EVMS) is required 
for FPIF contracts over $20 million, with a formally validated and accepted EVMS 
required for FPIF contracts over $50 million (DOD, 2015). The Defense Acquisition 
Guidebook defines Earned Value Management as “a management approach…to ensure 
the total integration of cost, schedule, and work scope aspects of the program.” (DOD, 
2013, para. 11.3.1). Like accounting systems, EVMS are costly and difficult to 
implement. A joint Coopers & Lybrand/TASC, Inc. (C&L/TASC) study indicated that 
EVMS ranked third among the top ten cost drivers for contractors in activity-based 
costing systems, adding a nearly one percent cost premium to a contract. The C&L/TASC 
study also found that contractors felt EVMS requirements were too expensive, repetitive, 
and voluminous, as well as using program management resources better spent focusing 
on contract performance (1994). 
(3) Higher Degree of Government Administration 
FPIF contracts place additional administrative burden on the government as well 
as the contractor. The government has the responsibility to determine the adequacy of the 
contractor’s required accounting system, through DCAA audits or other measures the 
contracting officer deems acceptable for determining contractor responsibility. 
The requirement for EVMS reporting also creates a requirement for government 
administration of the reporting. Receiving EVMS data allows the government to monitor 
contractor performance at regular intervals, but evaluating this voluminous data is a time-
consuming and complex endeavor. The government must employ personnel to review 
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and analyze the EVMS reporting and make determinations about how the contractor is 
performing relative to cost and schedule budgets for the contract. The results of EVMS 
data evaluation may require further government administration if changes to the 
contract’s requirements or schedule are indicated. 
(4) Lack of Government Workforce Experience 
Our research indicates that FPIF-type contracts are not widely utilized at many 
commands. When we attempted to expand our research beyond PEO Missiles and Space 
to PEO Ground Combat Systems (GCS) and PEO Combat Support and Combat Service 
Support (CS&CSS), we found very few instances of FPIF contract use in acquisitions for 
those two PEOs. A survey seeking interview sources within ACC-Warren revealed that 
only three individuals out of the approximately sixty contract price/cost analysts, or five 
percent, had experience negotiating FPIF contracts. This indicates that the government 
workforce has a marked lack of experience in crafting, negotiating, and administering 
FPIF contracts. 
D. BETTER BUYING POWER AND FPIF CONTRACTS 
In 2010, the DOD had a budget of approximately $700 billion. Of that total, 
approximately $400 billion was spent on contracts for major weapon systems, supplies, 
fuel, services, and transportation (Carter, 2010a). As budgets have become more fiscally 
constrained in the last decade, it has become imperative for the Department’s acquisition 
community’s contracting activities to become more efficient. 
On June 28, 2010, the Defense acquisition world got its first official hint of Better 
Buying Power (BBP). Ashton Carter, then-USD (AT&L), issued a memorandum titled 
“Better Buying Power: Mandate for Restoring Affordability and Productivity in Defense 
Spending,” which was aimed at improving the way the DOD does business and 
delivering better value for taxpayer dollars. BBP’s objective was to conduct DOD 
acquisitions more efficiently, with the ultimate goal of obtaining “two to three percent net 
annual growth in warfighting capabilities without incurring a commensurate budget 
increase by identifying and eliminating unproductive or low-value-added overhead; in 
effect, doing more without more” (Carter, 2010a, p. 2). 
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1. BBP 1.0 
On September 14, 2010, in a memo titled “Guidance for Obtaining Greater 
Efficiency in Productivity in Defense Spending,” Carter further elaborated on how BBP 
would help improve effectiveness and efficiency within DOD acquisition. BBP 
introduced five major areas: 
1. Target affordability and control cost growth; 
2. Incentivize productivity and innovation in industry; 
3. Promote real competition; 
4. Improve tradecraft in services acquisition; and 
5. Reduce non-productive process and bureaucracy (Carter, 2010b). 
Of the five focus areas, the second one, “Incentivize productivity and innovation 
in industry,” had as one of its principal actions to increase the use of FPIF-type contracts, 
where appropriate. In general, FPIF is viewed as being most applicable in early 
production and in sole-source production where the government can reward year-over-
year cost improvements (Carter, 2010b). 
2. BBP 2.0 
In November 2012, Frank Kendall, Carter’s successor as USD (AT&L), issued a 
memorandum to the Defense acquisition workforce indicating that the original BBP 
mandate was not static, one-time guidance and would continue to evolve and incorporate 
new ideas and lessons learned. As a result, BBP (now referred to as BBP 1.0) was 
succeeded by Better Buying Power 2.0 (BBP 2.0), which reinforced and modified BBP 
1.0 guidance, as well as introducing new initiatives (Kendall, 2012). Whereas BBP 1.0 
had focused on best practices in acquisition, BBP 2.0 interlaced those best practices with 
an emphasis on applying professional technical judgment. 
The April 24, 2013, BBP 2.0 implementation directive memorandum listed seven 
key areas of focus to continue achieving greater efficiency and productivity in DOD 
contracting, including: 
1. Achieve affordable programs; 
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2. Control costs throughout the product life cycle; 
3. Incentivize productivity and innovation in industry and government; 
4. Eliminate unproductive processes and bureaucracy; 
5. Promote effective competition; 
6. Improve tradecraft in acquisition of services; 
7. Improve the professionalism of the total acquisition workforce (Kendall, 
2013a). 
BBP 2.0 outlined three initiatives to support the focus area “Incentivize 
productivity and innovation in industry and Government” that are related to the use of 
FPIF contracts. First, the initiative “Align profitability more tightly with Department 
goals” addresses the importance of profit as the prime motivator of defense contractors 
and stresses that profit is essential to maintaining a strong defense industrial base. This 
initiative puts forth the idea that DOD profit policy and acquisition strategies should 
effectively incentivize defense industry contractors to develop and deliver cost-effective 
and align profitability with contract performance (Kendall, 2013a). 
The other two initiatives related to this focus area, “Employ appropriate contract 
types” and “Increase use of Fixed Price Incentive contracts in Low Rate Initial 
Production,” are closely linked and provide clarity to the principal actions of BBP 1.0. 
The “Employ appropriate contract types” initiative urges DOD contracting professionals 
to consider the entire spectrum of contract types and tailor the contract type to the 
product or service being procured by considering, among other factors, the appropriate 
allocation of risk between the government and the contractor. This initiative also clarifies 
that BBP 1.0 was not encouraging FPIF contract types to the exclusion of other types 
(Kendall, 2013a). 
The initiative “Increase use of Fixed Price Incentive contracts in Low Rate Initial 
Production” further clarifies that BBP 1.0’s focus on FPIF contracts was primarily 
intended to discourage the use of FFP contracts too early in a program’s life cycle 
(Kendall, 2013a). During TD and EMD, requirements are certain to change and evolve, 
making it difficult or impossible for the government or the contractor to accurately 
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estimate manufacturing costs. However, employing an FPIF contract during a program’s 
transition from development to production may be a method for mitigating manufacturing 
cost risk. 
3. BBP 3.0 
Two years after the inception of BBP 2.0, Kendall released the “Implementation 
Directive for Better Buying Power 3.0—Achieving Dominant Capabilities through 
Technical Excellence and Innovation.”  BBP 3.0 placed a stronger emphasis than did its 
predecessors on innovation, quality products, and technological military superiority; 
however, it was characterized as “more continuity than change” (Kendall, 2015a, p. 1). 
Like BBP 2.0, BBP 3.0 represented incremental evolution from its predecessor rather 
than any radical change. With respect to FPIF contracts, this continuous improvement is 
evident in retaining the core initiative “Incentivize productivity in industry and 
Government.” 
This core initiative continues to emphasize the guidance to “Align profitability 
more tightly with Department goals” by declaring that profit should be reasonable and 
commensurate with contract performance; that is, higher profit levels should be tied to 
better contract performance. Likewise, poorer contract performance should result in 
lower profit levels (Kendall, 2015a). 
BBP 3.0 combines the two BBP 2.0 initiatives “Employ appropriate contract 
types” and “Increase use of Fixed Price Incentive contracts in Low Rate Initial 
Production” into a single piece of guidance: “Employ appropriate contract types, but 
increase the use of incentive type contracts.” Citing the 2014 Annual Report on the 
Performance of the Defense Acquisition System, the BBP 3.0 Implementation Directive 
states that earlier BBP focus on incentive-type contracts has been effective in correlating 
contract incentives with improved cost and schedule performance (2015a). As a result, 
BBP 3.0 reinforces the DOD’s preference for employing incentive type contracts, 
including FPIF contracts, when appropriate. 
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Determining when FPIF contracts are appropriate is a matter of professional 
judgement and must take into consideration myriad procurement aspects. Kendall has 
stated that “for low-risk programs in the Engineering and Manufacturing Development 
phase and for most programs in production, where products and processes are well 
understood, FPIF contracts can be very effective in incentivizing cost control and 
productivity growth” (Kendall, 2011, p. 3). It is worth noting that Kendall states it is not 
the aim of BBP or the FPIF contract type to reduce contractor profits to improve DOD 
efficiency and program affordability. On the contrary, DOD is willing to pay increased 
profit if the contractor is able to reduce the overall program cost and deliver better 
performance (Kendall, 2011). The BBP goal of increasing the use of FPIF contracts is to 
use contractors’ profit motive to incentivize better contractor performance. This results 
from allowing contractors to recognize increased profit margins by sharing in cost 
underruns that may result from more efficient and effective contract performance. 
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III. DATA AND ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In an attempt to assess the real-world impacts of transitioning from FFP to FPIF, 
the researchers conducted interviews of programs making this change. We reached out to 
numerous programs in several Program Executive Offices responsible for the Army’s 
major weapon systems, but were only able to establish connections with programs within 
the Program Executive Office, Missiles and Space organization. A total of four 
interviews were conducted and a summary from each interview is attached as part of 
Appendix C. A list of the interview questions can be found in Appendix B. All four 
programs are ACAT IC Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs) conducting 
follow-on production procurements in the Operations and Sustainment phase of their life 
cycles. An MDAP’s ACAT level can either be designated by the Defense Acquisition 
Executive or determined by its estimated cost for all planned program increments (DOD, 
2015). DOD Instruction 5000.02 states that an ACAT IC is an MDAP whose estimated 
cost in FY14 constant dollars for all planned increments is expected to exceed $480 
million in research, development, test, and evaluation type funds, or $2.79 billion in 
procurement type funds. It further states that an ACAT IC’s milestone decision authority 
is a “DOD component head or, if delegated, the DOD component acquisition executive” 
(DOD, 2015, p. 44). 
For the purposes of this research, and to eliminate any concerns relative to 
competition sensitive information, we have protected the anonymity of the programs and 
their prime contractors. No data or observations are directly attributed to any individual 
program. Programs and contractors are identified only by generic designators (e.g., 
Program A, Contractor 1) in order to avoid disclosure of contractors’ proprietary or 
competition sensitive information. 
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B. THE PROGRAMS 
1. Program A 
This program entered Full Rate Production approximately 30 years ago. Their 
contracts serve primarily as a mechanism for procuring hardware, as well as some limited 
amount of services and Integrated Logistics Support, from Contractor 1. Due to 
fluctuating requirements, their contracting approach is for a single year procurement. 
Over the last several procurements, each year has been awarded as an Undefinitized 
Contract Action (UCA) due to time constraints. 
2. Program B 
This program entered Full Rate Production almost 50 years ago. Their contracts 
serve as a mechanism for procuring hardware from Contractor 2. This particular program 
has a multiyear contract, covering five years (FY12-16). Each year of this contract has 
been awarded as an UCA due to time constraints. This means that deliveries for earlier 
years have already completed prior to definitization. 
3. Program C 
This program entered Full Rate Production just over 20 years ago. Their contracts 
serve as a mechanism for procuring hardware from Contractor 1. This particular program 
has a three year contract (FY13-15). 
4. Program D 
This program entered Full Rate Production just over 30 years ago. Their contracts 
serve as a mechanism for procuring hardware from Contractor 1. This particular program 
has a three year production contract (FY15-17) for hardware only. A drastic change in 
user requirements resulted in the first year being awarded as a UCA. 
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C. DISCUSSION OF DATA COLLECTED 
The collection and interpretation of data is a very important step in the research 
process. Otherwise, all inferences about this topic would be speculation on the part of the 
researchers. This section discusses the data the researchers collected through interviews 
with program management personnel and contracting professionals. 
1. Program Background 
We interviewed individuals from a total of four programs that have made the 
transition from FFP to FPIF. Within those four programs, there are two major defense 
contractors represented. Across these programs, the contracts primarily focused on the 
procurement of hardware (with one program purchasing a limited amount of services, 
relative to the hardware being procured). All four programs are very mature and have 
been in the Operations and Sustainment phase of the life cycle for quite some time. Of 
the four programs, only one was receiving Cost and Software Data Reporting (CSDR) 
Form 1921 data at the time of transition to FPIF. CSDR Form 1921, titled “Cost Data 
Summary Report,” is used to report and collect contractors’ actual incurred program costs 
and other related business data (DOD, 2013). Among other things, program managers can 
use CSDR data to estimate the costs of future production increments and inform 
decisions about which contract type is most appropriate. Figure 7 identifies some of the 
basic attributes of the four programs we studied. 
 
 Attributes of Studied Programs Figure 7. 
Life Cycle CSDR 1921 Previous Final
Program Contractor Hardware Services Phase Data Contract Type Contract Type
A 1 X X O&S X FFP FPIF
B 2 X O&S FFP FPIF
C 1 X O&S X FFP FFP
D 1 X O&S FFP FPIF
Products Procured
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2. The Impacts of the Transition 
The overall intent of this research is to determine the impacts of transitioning 
from FFP to FPIF. Therefore, the interviews with each program focused on the collection 
of data to support this topic. As mentioned before, the interview questions can be found 
in Appendix B, and a detailed summary of each interview can be found in Appendix C. 
For the purposes of discussion, that data will be discussed in the following sections for 
each program. Table 1 shows a top level summary of how these impacts fall into the 
categories of short, mid, and long term. 
Table 1.   Summary of Interview Findings of Program Impacts Resulting from 
the Transition from FFP to FPIF. 
Impacts of Transitioning from FFP to FPIF 
Program Short Term Mid Term Long Term 
A  12 month schedule slip in 
contract award 
 No previous knowledge 
of FPIF contract 
administration 
 EVM now required 
 Seeing more cost 
data than historically 
 Early indications 
show a decrease in 
profit 
 Not yet applicable 
B  EVM now required 
 Delay in negotiations 
 Not yet applicable  Not yet applicable 
C  Not yet applicable  Not yet applicable  Not yet applicable 
D  Delays to negotiations 
 EVM now required 
 No previous knowledge 
of FPIF contract 
administration 
 Not yet applicable  Not yet applicable 
 
a. Program A 
For this program, the transition from FFP to FPIF occurred in 2015. They 
awarded their FY14 procurement in December 2014 as an FFP UCA. During their peer 
review with the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Defense Procurement and 
Acquisition Policy (DPAP), they were directed by Mr. Assad, Director of Defense 
Pricing, to change contract type to FPIF. This direction came when their CSDR 1921 data 
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showed a previously realized profit of approximately 30% at both the prime contractor 
and subcontractor levels. Once Contractor 1 was informed of the change, they notified 
the government that they would have to revise their-proposal, adding six months to the 
delays in procurement lead time. After sustaining a 12 month delay, this program 
successfully definitized their FY14 procurement in the first quarter of FY16 as an FPIF 
contract. Currently, both their FY15 and FY16 procurements have been awarded as 
UCAs. The government is working to definitize these contracts as FPIF contracts. 
(1) What are the Positive Aspects of This Transition? 
 Per the Contracting Officer, they are seeing more cost data than ever 
before. 
 According to interviewees, OSD analyses indicated the program’s 
previous 30% realized profit has decreased to an actual profit rate of 
approximately 20%. This analysis does not include data for the complete 
contract effort. The final profit percentage may still increase or decrease. 
(2) What are the Negative Aspects of This Transition? 
 Although the contractor stated they had never had a cost overrun, just six 
days after contract definitization, the contractor notified the government of 
a cost overrun. 
 Because the contract was previously FFP, the contractor had not been 
required to submit Earned Value Management (EVM) data. As an FPIF 
contract, this was a new requirement, so several things came in to play. 
First, the cost for Contractor 1 to submit this data was approximately 
$500K per year. The government would need to have at least two people 
to review and analyze this data, which they did not have. Luckily, after 12 
months, Program A was able to obtain a Class Waiver, thus eliminating 
this requirement. 
 To date, all of the work for this contract has not been completed; 
therefore, the incentive determinations have not been made. However, for 
an FY14 funded requirement, procurement funds will expire on 30 
September 2016. If the contractor has not completed all of their work and 
submitted necessary data for analysis, this funding could expire for 
obligation. 
 Contractor 1 presented significant resistance to this transition, causing a 
delay in definitization. However, as stated, this contract was awarded as 
FPIF. 
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(3) What are the Anticipated Benefits of This Transition? 
 Program A is hoping for a decrease in the profit percentage. Currently, the 
contractor’s cost data shows they are tracking toward a decrease of 
approximately 10%. However, this could change as the contractor still has 
not completed all of the work. 
b. Program B 
For this program, the transition from FFP to FPIF occurred in 2016. At the time of 
transition to FPIF, all five years of the multiyear contract had been awarded under one large 
(over $1 billion) UCA. Each year, the UCA was amended to add additional quantities for that 
year’s procurement requirement. During their OSD DPAP Peer Review, they were directed 
by Mr. Assad to change contract type to FPIF. This direction was given due to the lack of 
CSDR 1921 data that could be used to verify that the proposal costs were reasonable. This 
direction recently occurred and Program B is currently waiting on the contractor to submit a 
pricing update to their proposal. Once the pricing update is submitted, the government will 
begin negotiations with Contractor 2. Given that Contractor 2 has expressed disagreement 
with the FPIF approach, since a significant amount of work has been completed and all the 
contract deliverables were awarded under an FFP UCA, it is unknown at this time what 
further impacts will occur relative to the award timeline. 
(1) What are the Positive Aspects of This Transition? 
 At this time, Program B has been unable to realize any benefits of this 
transition. 
(2) What are the Negative Aspects of This Transition? 
 The beginning of negotiations to definitize the UCA were delayed in order 
to wait on the contractor to submit a pricing update. 
 Having previously been FFP, Earned Value Management (EVM) data had 
not been required. As an FPIF contract, this was a new requirement. At 
this time, this program does not have personnel with the expertise of 
evaluating and managing this data. It is likely that they will proceed with 
requesting a waiver for this requirement. 
 Program B does not have any experience in managing FPIF type contracts. 
 This multi-year contract has been awarded in its entirety as an FFP UCA. 
A good portion of the deliveries associated with this award have already 
 41 
been delivered to Program B. Therefore, it is not clear how it will benefit 
the government to award as FPIF.  
 There is no way for Program B to realize savings on expired money as any 
funding removed is already expired for the purposes of obligation. 
Furthermore, this funding cannot be used for other purposes or programs. 
(3) What are the Anticipated Benefits of This Transition? 
 Program B is hoping for a decrease in the profit percentage. 
c. Program C  
For this program, there has been no transition. During their most recent contract 
award and peer review, concern was expressed early on by OSD that there would be a 
potential recommendation/direction to transition from FFP to FPIF. Program C was able 
to defend their cost analyses with supporting information from the contractor via their 
CSDR 1921 data. This proved to be very influential in the review with OSD. This 
program had a realized profit percentage of approximately 15%. Since there is no 
transition, there are no pros and cons to be discussed. 
d. Program D 
For this program, the direction to make this transition from FFP to FPIF occurred in 
2016. This decision was made at a local level, prior to going to the OSD DPAP Peer 
Review. It was the determination of the Director of Army Contracting Command, Redstone 
Arsenal to make this transition. Shortly following this decision, this path forward was 
briefed at the OSD DPAP Peer Review and given the support of Mr. Shay Assad, Director 
of Defense Pricing. This decision was made based upon the following data points. First, 
this program was not yet receiving CSDR 1921 cost data. Second, the pricing analysis 
showed suppliers were realizing excessively high profit percentages. Finally, the pricing 
analysis showed the prime contract had realized a 30% profit percentage previously. 
However, it was the contention of Program D that this realized profit was skewed due to 
some non-recurring efforts performed under this contract type. Additionally, although they 
did not have CSDR 1921 data at the time of decision, the data is a deliverable of the current 
contract. Currently, negotiations are underway for this program, but Contractor 1 has yet to 
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provide a counteroffer in an FPIF format and still contends it should be FFP. It is not yet 
known how this will be resolved between the two parties. 
(1) What are the Positive Aspects of This Transition? 
 At this time, Program D has been unable to realize any benefits of this 
transition. 
(2) What are the Negative Aspects of This Transition? 
 The beginning of negotiations were delayed in order to wait on the 
government to establish an FPIF offer. 
 Because the contract was previously FFP, the contractor had not been 
required to submit Earned Value Management (EVM) data. As an FPIF 
contract, this was a new requirement. At this time, this program does not 
have personnel with the expertise of evaluating and managing this data. It 
is likely that they will proceed with requesting a waiver for this 
requirement. 
 Program D does not have any experience in managing FPIF type contracts. 
 Currently, it is the perception of Program D that the ability to realize 
benefits to the warfighter due to any contract underruns will be 
impossible. Currently, this contract is a three year contract and the 
program receives procurement funding. For hypothetical purposes, Figure 





 Hypothetical Funding Scenario for Program D. Figure 8. 
(3) What are the Anticipated Benefits of This Transition? 
 Program D is hoping for a decrease in the profit percentage.   
D. DATA ANALYSIS 
Based upon the data collected by the researchers, it is our overall determination 
that more data is needed. Within three PEOs for major weapon systems for the Army, we 
were able to identify only a handful of programs that have transitioned from FFP to FPIF. 
We interviewed personnel from all applicable programs that were willing to participate. 
Therefore, we have based our analyses on that data that has been made available. 
However, we feel it would be best to study a larger sample size. A larger sample would 
provide more data points and permit further analysis. 
1. Overview of the Transition from FFP to FPIF 
All four of the programs we studied are major weapon systems within PEO 
Missiles and Space that contemplated a possible change from FFP to FPIF for follow-on 
production increments. All of these programs are ACAT IC MDAPs that have been in 
production for many years and have expended multiple billions of dollars over their life 
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cycles. All of these programs had previously utilized only FFP for production of 
hardware; none had previously utilized FPIF contracts during production. For the three 
programs that did determine that a transition to FPIF was appropriate, these transitions 
have occurred after the 2010 introduction of the Better Buying Power initiatives. 
2. Impetus for the Transition from FFP to FPIF 
With the push to “do more without more,” it seems that OSD is putting a great 
deal of focus and pressure on programs where contractors have realized higher profit 
percentages than were negotiated on previous FFP production increments. In the case of 
the four programs interviewed, the three that were directed to FPIF from FFP were 
dealing with high profit percentages. Two of the programs were directed by Mr. Assad to 
use FPIF, while the third program’s contract type determination was made by the local 
Army Contracting Command director. Additionally, within the four programs, Contractor 
1 is the prime contractor for three of these. Does that mean that Contractor 1 is a 
“problem child,” working to gain as much profit from government contracts as possible?  
We do not know the answer to this with the data that we collected, but it does stand out as 
a possibility. 
3. Challenges Resulting from the Transition to FPIF 
All three of the programs that have transitioned to FPIF contracts have 
encountered several challenges resulting from the switch from FFP to FPIF. First, the 
decision to change contract type has resulted in lengthy delays in negotiations for all 
three programs. Delays were particularly problematic in instances where the requirement 
had been awarded as a UCA and the contractors had previously expected to negotiate 
FFP contracts. The mid-procurement shifts in contract type were met with vehement 
resistance from the contractors, leading to many months of delay in providing negotiation 
offers, which further resulted in delays in contract definitization. 
Second, the requirement to obtain EVM data has been complicated for programs 
that have transitioned to FPIF. This is a new requirement, because while EVM data is 
required for FPIF contracts, it had not been required under the previous FFP increments. 
 45 
For one of the programs, it was estimated that the contractor’s cost to submit this data 
was approximately $500,000. Furthermore, the PEO estimated that each program would 
need at least two people to review and analyze this data; however, none of the three 
programs currently employ personnel with the expertise of evaluating and managing 
EVM data. While Program A was eventually able to obtain a waiver of the requirement, 
it took an entire year to gain this approval. The other two transitioned programs have not 
yet obtained waivers, but it is likely that they will proceed with requesting that OSD 
waive the EVM requirement. 
Finally, the program offices and the supporting contracting activity both lack 
experience with FPIF contracts. None of the three program offices affected by an FPIF 
transition have any previous knowledge of FPIF contract administration. 
4. Benefits Resulting from the Transition to FPIF 
Of the programs that have transitioned to FPIF, all of their transitions have 
occurred within the last two fiscal years. This is so recent that none of them have had the 
opportunity to see completed performance of an FPIF contract. Therefore, it is unknown 
what the contractors’ final actual costs and realized profit rates will be in relation to the 
target costs, target profits, and ceiling prices established at the time of contract award. 
However, the one program that did have an estimated profit rate found that the contractor 
is currently experiencing a profit rate of approximately 20%, which is a substantial 
decrease from the 30% actual profit rate the contractor realized on the previous FFP 
production increment. Although this estimate does not include data for the complete 
contract effort and the final profit percentage may still increase or decrease, early 
indications are that the government will realize a cost benefit by using FPIF on this 
program. 
The three programs that have transitioned to FPIF also receive more actual data 
than they received historically from contractors, as the contractor is required to provide 
actual data on the cost of contract performance at regular intervals. This cost reporting 
provides the government with greater visibility into the cost of hardware and services it 
buys and helps inform programmatic decisions. With respect to EVM data, this reporting 
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can give the government early knowledge of cost and schedule variances. While one 
program we studied had obtained a waiver of the EVM requirement, the status of waivers 
on the other two programs is not final. Therefore, it is not currently known if these 
programs will obtain EVM data and its resulting benefits. 
In general, because these programs have transitioned to FPIF so recently, and 
none have seen performance of an FPIF contract to completion, it is not possible to 
understand or predict the mid- or long-term benefits may be achieved in the future. It is 
worth noting that all of these programs are close to the end of their “life.”  None of these 
programs has seen a milestone decisions in over 20 years. At this point in their life cycle, 
textbooks would say these programs should be awarded as FFP, not FPIF. As discussed 
in this chapter, none of these programs have seen any long-term impacts from 
transitioning to FPIF contracts. Only one of the programs has mid-term impacts. It does 
appear that the longer the program is in an FPIF environment, the more the program 
impacts start trending toward the positive aspects from the negative. However, given the 
late stage of their life cycles, will these programs be around long enough to ever get to 
that point? 
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IV. THE “WAR ON PROFIT”: A CORPORATE PERSPECTIVE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The Better Buying Power initiatives have encouraged the DOD to “do more 
without more” (Carter, 2010a, p. 4), and one of the principal actions to accomplish that is 
to use more FPIF type contracts instead of cost type or FFP type. The government’s 
position is that by incentivizing the contractors, contractors will in turn control costs and 
be innovative to increase their profits. And because the government is willing to share in 
the cost overruns under an FPIF contract, the target cost should be less than the awarded 
price of an FFP contract. As part of the incentive, the government gets a share of any cost 
underruns, making BBP and the increased use of FPIF contracts a win for both sides—at 
least, according to the government. Industry has taken a different view of BBP and what 
they see as the government’s ongoing “war on profit.” 
B. HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL CLIMATE 
During the military buildup in the 1980s, the Persian Gulf war in the early 1990s, and 
the Iraq and Afghanistan wars from 2001 to 2011, contracts with the DOD were numerous 
and the profit plentiful. Profit rates from 8–15% could be found throughout this time, despite 
the push as early as the 1980s to reduce costs by moving from cost type contracts to more 
firm fixed price contracts and the “doing less with less” initiative during the 1990s (Gill, 
2014, p. 11). The need for new and better equipment to support the war efforts took 
precedence over the need to reduce cost and profit (Gill, 2014). Now, as the war effort has 
drawn down, the political climate has again changed, and the Pentagon is again under 
pressure to reduce their budget and eliminate unaffordable programs (Erwin, 2013). 
C. PROFIT AND THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY 
It is easy to find examples of defense contractors egregiously overcharging the 
DOD for the goods and services it buys.  Four hundred dollar hammers and $600 toilet 
seats are the stuff of legends. More recently, DOD Inspector General audits have found 
that major contractors, such as Sikorsky, Boeing, and Bell Helicopter have charged 
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enormously excessive prices for spare parts; anywhere from 3 to 17 times above fair and 
reasonable prices from Bell Helicopter, all the way to a shocking 177,000 percent 
overcharge from Boeing (Smithberger, 2015). But do these headlines tell the whole 
story? Are they typical of defense contractors’ profits or are they isolated incidents? This 
section examines the definition of profit and related DOD guidance and analyzes whether 
contractors in the defense industry are actually reaping windfall profit margins. 
1. Definition and Guidance 
Merriam-Webster.com defines profit as “money that is made in a business, 
through investing, etc., after all the costs and expenses are paid: a financial gain” (Profit, 
n.d.). Ultimately, profit is the essential reason that businesses exist: to make money and 
provide a return on investment to their shareholders or owners. If a business does not earn 
a profit on its revenues, it will eventually die. 
The dictionary definition of profit differs from the FAR definition of profit or fee. 
Although profit and fee are often casually used interchangeably, profit specifically 
indicates a contractor’s return on fixed-price type contracts and fee indicates the return on 
cost-type contracts. Per FAR (2016) § 15.404-4, profit or fee are not necessarily 
indicative of net income received by the contractor. 
Rather, they represent that element of the potential total remuneration that 
contractors may receive for contract performance over and above 
allowable costs. This potential remuneration element and the 
Government’s estimate of allowable costs to be incurred in contract 
performance together equal the Government’s total prenegotiation 
objective. Just as actual costs may vary from estimated costs, the 
contractor’s actual realized profit or fee may vary from negotiated profit 
or fee, because of such factors as efficiency of performance, incurrence of 
costs the Government does not recognize as allowable, and the contract 
type.  
There are a number of legitimate business costs that the contractor incurs but that 
FAR (2016) § 31 excludes from contract costs as being unallowable, such as bad debts, 
advertising, excess executive compensation, and interest on financing. The contractor’s 
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negotiated profit or fee must cover those costs too, and therefore, does not represent pure 
return to the contractor. 
What does the FAR say about limitations on profit or fee?  With regard to fee, 
FAR (2016) § 15.404-4(c)(4)(i) limits fee on most cost contracts to 10% (with an 
exception for R&D or experimental cost contracts, which are limited to 15%). However, 
the FAR makes no such prescription regarding profit for fixed price contracts. In the 
researchers’ experience, we have rarely seen FFP or FPIF contracts, especially for major 
weapon systems, negotiated above 15%. 
2. What Is Too Much Profit?  
In the absence of statutory or regulatory guidance, who defines how much profit 
is too much?  In 2010, President Obama spoke about excessive profits in general, 
remarking, “I mean, I do think at a certain point you’ve made enough money” (Obama, 
2010, para. 39). That attitude seems to have filtered down into Defense acquisition 
leadership. The Director of Defense Pricing has publicly commented that the DOD 
generally overpays for almost everything it buys and that he will be “relentless in 
pursuing getting the good deal for the taxpayers” (Mitchell, 2016). At a 2013 industry 
conference, General Wendy Masiello, then-Air Force Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Contracting stated,  
I need to understand the cost and the resulting profit. It’s a little scary that 
we’ve never had that, we’ve never had that kind of insight. It can be a 
little threatening that they figured out how to make a lot more money and 
return on that investment than the government might have been reaping in 
that process (Erwin, 2013, para. 12). 
Although Assad and other DOD acquisition leaders insist there is no war on 
profit, it is easy to see how comments like the preceding statements might lead the 
defense industry to conclude otherwise. 
3. Analysis of Defense Industry Profits 
While there are certainly arguments that defense contractors make too much 
money, we should ask the question: in relation to whom?  In order to determine whether 
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the amount of profit earned by defense contractors is excessive, we studied the industry’s 
average operating margin compared to operating margins in other industries in the 
Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 500 Index. The S&P 500 Index “includes 500 leading 
companies and captures approximately 80% of available market capitalization,” and its 
index assets total approximately $2.2 trillion (S&P 500, 2016). In 2014, the Defense 
Business Board (DBB) reported on average defense industry profit margins, concluding, 
“Compared to other markets, the Defense industry has the lowest returns” (p. 39). In 
Figure 9, the bold dark blue line represents the Renaissance Strategic Advisors Defense 
Index, which is comprised of 41 publicly-traded defense companies. Figure 9 clearly 
demonstrates that in nearly all of the 33 years covered by this graph, the Defense Index 
recognized lower operating margins than S&P indices for capital goods, pharmaceuticals 
and biotechnology, technical hardware, software and services, and utilities, and indeed, 
lower than the overall S&P 500 Index. 
 
 1980-2013 Defense Index Profit Margins Compared to Various S&P Figure 9. 
Indices. Source: Chandler (2014). 
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Dr. Daniel Gouré, a vice president with the nonprofit public-policy research 
organization Lexington Institute, reported in 2012 that the average operating margin in 
the defense and aerospace industry was 10.3 percent, while that of all U.S. industry is 
18.3 percent – a difference of 42 percent. However, even that 10.3 percent operating 
margin is a bit rosy. Since that profit margin includes both defense business and 
commercial business, and it is likely that the commercial portion earns higher margins, 
the margins attributable to defense contracts are even lower than the reported 10.3 
percent.   Furthermore, as Gouré reports and as evidenced in Figure 9, even the 10.3 
percent margin is high by historical standards. Gouré found that until the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan caused a surge in the demand for defense weapon systems, the average profit 
rate for the defense and aerospace industry was approximately eight percent. With 
declining defense budgets and the threat of sequestration, Gouré opines that it would be 
logical to expect defense industry profits to return to historic average levels over the next 
few years (Gouré, 2012). The most recent results available, for 2015, indicate that 
operating margins for the U.S. defense and aerospace sector have not changed much in 
the past few years; the 2015 average operating margin for this sector was 11.6% (Captain, 
2016). 
Specific to the major weapon systems under the purview of PEO Missiles and 
Space, former Lockheed Martin senior vice president for strategy and business 
development Robert H. Trice studied profit margins for what he termed the “Big 7” 
defense and aerospace contractors. Trice defines the Big 7 as including Lockheed Martin, 
Boeing, Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics, Raytheon, L3 Communications, and 
Honeywell Corporation (2012). Trice’s study found that in 2009, the average profit 
margin of the Big 7 members was around seven percent, far below the top companies 
from other industries such as IBM (14%), Cisco (17%), Microsoft (28%), or Merck 
(47%). Trice further notes that none of the Big 7 companies are included in “Fortune 
Magazine’s annual ‘Top 20’ lists among its 500 largest companies when measured in 
terms of return on revenue, return on assets, percent increase in profits, or percent 
increase in revenue” (2012, p. 4). Trice concludes that the Big 7 contractors, all of which 
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are players in PEO Missiles and Space programs, fall “in the middle of the American 
industrial pack in terms of profitability” (Trice, 2012, p. 4). 
D. DEFENSE CONTRACTORS’ PERSPECTIVE AND EFFECTS OF 
PROFIT POLICY 
If the government wishes to influence defense contractors and use profit as a 
motivator to incentivize them to provide more, at a lower price, we must first understand 
the contractor’s perspective. Why is it that dozens of contractors show up for an industry 
day, but very few actually bid when the solicitation is published?  Why do contractors 
compete to be part of a Multiple Award Task Order Contract, and then decline to 
compete for task orders over and over again? This section examines the defense 
industry’s reasons for contracting with the government. It also analyzes several 
consequences as a result of the industry’s perceived tightening of DOD profit policy. 
1. Benefits Received from Contracting with the Government 
There are myriad ways in which contractors benefit from entering into contracts 
with the government. The most obvious reason is profit. Contractors want government 
contracts to earn a return on their investment. Like companies in every industry, they 
have stockholders to satisfy. But there are many other, sometimes less quantifiable, 
things that make government contracts particularly attractive. Some of these attractions 
include dependable cash flow, reputation, and the potential for future business, including 
change orders. 
a. Cash Flow 
Reliable and regular cash flow is a top benefit of working on government 
contracts. The government is well known for paying its bills on time, and numerous 
contract financing methods exist, such as progress payments and performance-based 
payments, which ensure that the contractor receives a steady and reliable flow of cash 
during contract execution rather than having to wait for payment until performance is 
complete. This allows the contractor to order material, pay its subcontractors, and 
maintain its labor force, arguably one of its most valuable assets. 
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b. Reputation and Future Business 
Maybe more important than profit, is the promise of follow-on contracts. For 
large acquisitions like a weapon system, taking a development contract for little or no 
profit, possibly even at a loss, is a smart move to gain access to technology and to earn 
the ability to bid on the follow-on production contract, where the earning potential lies. 
Furthermore, being well known as a reliable defense contractor can assist with earning 
follow-on contracts, as having favorable past performance ratings is often crucial to 
future contract awards. 
c. Change Orders 
The reason least talked about by the government is for the anticipated “change 
orders.”  When the government has not defined its requirements well, contractors can be 
tempted to “buy in” or underbid to obtain the contract with the intention of earning profit 
on the change orders issued after award (Summers IV, 1995).   Some companies openly 
advertise for project managers to assist them in discovering opportunities for such change 
orders. The controls company, Johnsons Controls, advertised a job opening for the 
position of Systems Technology Project Manager whose second principal duty was, 
“Evaluates the contractual scope of work and the impact of client issued bulletins, field 
directives and/or scheduling changes. Actively pursues additional work through change 
orders. Performs associated cost estimates, prepares proposals, negotiates final settlement 
price and customer acceptance” (Systems Technology Project Manager, n.d.). Figure 10 
humorously illustrates how lucrative this can be for contractors. The figure depicts a tiny 




  The Yacht “Change Order” with its dinghy “Original Contract.” Figure 10. 
Source: Buckshon (2009). 
2. Resulting Effects of Profit Policy  
As the government’s budget sequestration woes continue, it is difficult for 
companies to project government spending trends. Add to that the cancelation or severe 
curtailment of major projects and contractors are finding work with the government to be 
an increasingly risky proposition. Being unsure if the contract being bid will last for five 
years, or if it will be canceled after two, contractors have to weigh all the pros and cons 
of government contracts carefully. Add to this all the BBP reforms and industry feels it is 
being squeezed. More and more, the government is demanding insight into companies’ 
cost structures, bringing on cost estimators and creating a defense-wide pricing database 
to assist program managers and PCOs with their negotiations, using the contractor’s own 
cost data to negotiate lower prices and profit rates (Butler, 2011). As one CEO put it, “the 
initiative saves taxpayer money; but it also threatens to undermine industry’s ability to 
invest in new technologies by squeezing profits” (Blakey, 2011, para. 3). The profit 
policy resulting from the reforms may have unintended consequences which may be 
poorly understood by the DOD. 
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a. Barriers to Innovation 
The DBB reported in July 2014 that the DOD’s reliance on FAR Part 15 
“Contracting by Negotiation” is a significant barrier to innovation. Profit earned on 
contracts allows the defense industry to invest in developing new and innovative 
technologies for future military applications. These innovations benefit not only the 
government but also serve many positive purposes for the contractor. The DBB found 
several key reasons that defense contractors seek to invest in innovative technologies, 
including: 
 Innovation helps companies differentiate themselves from their 
competition, thereby conferring a competitive advantage 
 New technologies lead to revenue growth and expansion of profit margin. 
This is likely to be even more true in cases where the contractor can apply 
that technology to products it offers to commercial customers 
 Successful development and sales of innovative products leads to long-
term profitability and sustainable market value (2014). 
However, when contractors find their return on investment reduced through 
aggressive profit negotiations, they have fewer profit dollars to invest in innovation. As 
Pierre Chao from the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ Defense Industrial 
Initiatives Group testified to the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee: 
Pushing the limits of technology is expensive, is fraught with risk and 
setbacks, and can rarely be predicted with precision. Some of the cost 
overruns and delays are simply inherent to what we ask the acquisition 
system to undertake. As long as technological superiority is a key goal it 
will be impossible to reduce the overruns to zero. It does not mean we 
should tolerate poor performance and not try to improve the efficiency of 
the system; it simply says eliminating all cost overruns is incompatible 
with our strategic goals and potentially counterproductive (2013, p. 4). 
Major defense contractors, including some, such as Northrop Grumman, who do 
business with PEO Missiles and Space, have been criticized by investors for reducing 
their spending on independent research and development (Erwin, 2015). However, it is 
not just contractors who are becoming reluctant to fund investment in new technologies. 
The DBB found that the profit margins earned by defense contractors are inadequate to 
attract investment capital from investors interested in innovation. These investors regard 
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companies in the defense sector more as a source of cash than as a source of innovative 
technologies. As a result, they often choose to invest in other sectors they view as more 
innovative with higher potential profits (2014). 
b. Workforce 
Profitable contractors attract a talented and highly educated workforce by paying 
salaries commensurate with employees’ level of experience. When the DOD negotiates 
hard and pushes contractors to provide the lowest possible price, contractors are forced to 
reduce their investment in talent development; employment of experienced, but more 
expensive, personnel; and providing benefit packages that attract and keep the best 
personnel (Defense Business Board, 2014).    Eventually, the contractor will not be able 
to maintain the personnel needed to execute the contract successfully, resulting in poor 
performance and poor product. The government should be concerned when major defense 
contractors are able to report strong returns, but are earning those returns by shedding 20 
percent of their workforce over a five year period, like Lockheed Martin recently did 
(Thompson, 2013). The DBB determined that slimmer profit margins make it extremely 
difficult for defense contractors to retain highly-skilled employees in certain fields. 
Defense contractors must compete with Wall Street firms and Silicon Valley technology 
companies for the nation’s brightest and best employees. These non-defense sector 
companies continue to lure top talent away from defense contractors with better salaries 
and benefits packages, as well as the promise of more interesting, challenging, and 
innovative duties (Defense Business Board, 2014). 
Loss of talented and experienced personnel is potentially problematic for PEO 
Missiles and Space. In the 2013 Annual Industrial Capabilities Report to Congress, the 
USD (AT&L)’s Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manufacturing 
and Industrial Base Policy states that missile systems are largely defense-unique solutions 
that require a specialized labor force for design, engineering, and production. 
Furthermore, it is difficult for contractors in this sector to attract and retain a workforce 
with the specialized industrial knowledge necessary to support these programs. The 
report states that fluctuations in missile demand, contraction of the defense budget, and 
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DOD profit policy have reduced the existing labor expertise in missile technologies. The 
report also finds that this is particularly a problem for design engineering for missile 
propulsion systems and tri-mode seeker technology, which are wholly defense-unique 
capabilities (2013). 
c.  Effect on Cost Efficiencies 
Contractors must earn a return on their current investment in order to fund cost 
reduction measures and invest in efficiency initiatives. Cost reductions and production 
efficiencies on existing programs are essential to maintaining profitable programs. In a 
full-rate production environment, the contractor’s ability to reduce recurring costs often 
depends upon sufficient profit to reinvest in new capital equipment, tooling, and 
infrastructure. Profit is also required to fund programs such as Lean Six Sigma, which 
identifies process improvements to eliminate the inefficient use of physical resources, 
time, and effort in order to improve production quality and processes. Although these 
types of investments are initially expensive, they reap many benefits over the future 
course of recurring production of weapon systems. When the DOD strives to reduce 
contract profit rates, the contractor’s ability to invest in these cost-cutting measures is 
jeopardized, leaving them challenged to implement efficiency programs and reduce 
contract costs to the government. With regard to FPIF contracts, it is imperative that the 
contractor has the ability to identify and implement efficiency initiatives and reduce costs 
in order to achieve actual contract costs below the Target Cost and therefore earn a higher 
share of the resulting cost underrun, i.e., earn more profit. 
d. Shrinking Industrial and Technology Base 
The industrial base that supports the U.S. warfighter is a fundamental component 
of our country’s national security. However, when other industries’ profit margins are 
reaching 20% and more, while defense industry profit margins are at 12% or less, 
companies are forced to evaluate the business case for continuing in the defense sector. 
The fewer companies that are willing to compete for government contracts raises the risk 
of higher prices from the lack of competition and poorer quality from the lack of highly 
qualified suppliers (Anderson, 2013). Worse yet, it will not be the poorly performing 
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company with marginal skills that exits the defense industry. It will be the very 
successful companies with cutting edge technology and the brightest minds working for 
them. This loss could be a tremendous threat to the U.S. military’s technological 
advantage (Blakey, 2011). 
Supporting the industrial base is of particular concern for PEO Missiles and Space 
programs. According to the 2013 Annual Industrial Capabilities Report to Congress, the 
industrial sector that produces munitions and missiles is primarily a defense unique 
sector. The report also identifies that within this sector, two prime contractors account for 
approximately 85 percent of the DOD’s procurement funding for these types of products 
(2013). Having defense-unique capabilities concentrated into a small base of contractors 
who own the technical data rights to the missile systems is a risk to the DOD. If one or 
more of these key contractors were to decide to exit the defense industry, it could be a 
decade or more before the DOD could replace its missile capability with technology from 
different contractors, given the length of the Defense acquisition life cycle. 
The introduction of BBP 3.0 in 2015 maintained many of its predecessors’ 
efficiency and productivity issues, but provided a new focus with the theme of 
“Achieving Dominant Capabilities through Technical Excellence and Innovation” 
(Kendall, 2015a). BBP 3.0 acknowledges that the U.S.’s technological warfighting 
superiority is at risk from potential adversaries, and that the nation’s military capability 
depends on the efforts of the defense industrial base and their ability to innovate and 
develop military technologies (Kendall, 2015a). It is conceivable that profit policy 
resulting from other parts of the mandate, including increasing the use of incentive-type 
contracts, could be counterproductive to the overall goal. Indeed, since BBP was first 
introduced in 2010, there has been little entrance of contractors in the defense industrial 
base at either the prime contractor or subcontractor level. Rather, industry observers see a 
trend away from defense business throughout all sectors of DOD (Gill, 2014). It is 
reasonable to conclude that if defense firms were realizing “excessive” profits, more 
companies would be entering the defense section than leaving, growing the defense 
industrial base rather than shrinking it. 
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E. SUMMARY 
Mike O’Hanlon, a defense specialist at the Brookings Institution and a longtime 
Pentagon advisor, says the profit margin issue “is a big one where contractors and much 
of the DOD acquisition workforce part ways” (Mitchell, 2016, para. 33). Is the 
government waging war on contractor profit or just trying to get a “fair and reasonable” 
price for the U.S. taxpayer?  The answer can only be the ubiquitous “it depends.”   If you 
are the government and have been charged with “doing more without more,” you are only 
trying to save the taxpayer money and do the job you have been assigned. Profit is the 
one variable in the total cost equation that cannot be easily defined. The defense 
industry’s perception, on the other hand, is that they have been receiving “fair and 
reasonable” compensation during all the years they have been supplying the war effort. 
Now that the government is looking to reduce the DOD budget, that “fair and reasonable” 
rate is coming under attack. The attempt to “do more without more,” (Carter, 2010a) and 
the idea of determining what a program “should cost” (Kendall, 2015a) are perceived as 
the government’s way of saving taxpayer money by reducing both cost and profit, at the 
expense of contractors (Blakey, 2011). The profit rates desired by the government are 
often a lot lower than what contractors feel they need to finance their innovation and 
growth, while protecting them from the risk of the unknown. 
On the surface, the FPIF contract appears to be a perfect compromise to get both 
parties part of what they want and need to be successful. FPIF allows the parties to share 
risk and provides opportunities for contractors to earn additional profit as a result of 
efficiencies, which in turn, helps fund future investment in infrastructure and innovation. 
USD (AT&L) Frank Kendall acknowledged that profit is “the most powerful tool” the 
DOD can use to motivate contractors to provide better performance. However, he also 
notes that overly aggressive or inappropriate use of profit as a means of driving better 
contract performance may result in serious damage to the industrial base upon which the 
military depends to provide products and services to support the warfighter. Kendall 
cautions the DOD to  
think carefully about unintended consequences. Industry may look at the 
situation very differently than we do. We can assume industry will try to 
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maximize its profit—by whatever means we make available. We also can 
assume industry will examine all the available scenarios–including ones 
we have not intended. That means we need to anticipate industry’s 
behavior and make sure that we align industry objectives with the 
performance we intend. (2015b, p. 4) 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The DOD’s use of FPIF-type contracts has been increasing as a result of the 
advent of the Better Buying Power initiatives in 2010. The department has provided 
guidance on when FPIF is appropriate to use instead of FFP for follow-on production 
contracts. This project reviewed that guidance as well as various regulations regarding 
contract type. We collected data from four major weapon systems programs in PEO 
Missiles and Space that have transitioned from FFP to FPIF contracts to examine the 
impacts of the change in contract type. We also studied the defense contractor industry’s 
perspective on Better Buying Power and profit policy. This chapter presents the answers 
to the research questions posed in Chapter I. It also provides recommendations based on 
the researchers’ study, including a recommendation for additional research. 
A. CONCLUSIONS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
(1) What are the impacts of transitioning defense acquisition programs from 
firm-fixed price (FFP) type contracts to fixed-price incentive (firm target) 
(FPIF) type contracts? 
In order to assess the impacts when defense acquisition programs transition from 
FFP to FPIF contracts, we studied programs within PEO Missiles and Space that have 
made the transition by conducting personal interviews with subject matter experts within 
the PEO and the supporting contracting activity, including program management 
personnel and contracting officers. Although all of the programs we studied effected this 
change in contract type within the last two fiscal years and none have seen complete 
performance of an FPIF contract, we were able to assess some of the short-term impacts 
of the transition. The programs have experienced challenges and complications related to 
schedule delays, difficulties in obtaining earned value management data, inadequate 
workforce experience with incentive contracts, and funding uncertainties. The contractors 
supporting these programs have strongly disagreed with the government’s decision to 
utilize the FPIF contract type for these programs, adding further burden by causing delays 
in negotiations and contract definitization. Although these programs transitioned from 
FFP to FPIF so recently that contract performance is not complete, the government is 
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receiving actual cost data reporting that indicates in one instance, the contractor is 
achieving cost efficiencies and that the government may realize a cost benefit by using 
FPIF on the current increment of the program. 
(2) What does existing guidance prescribe regarding circumstances when 
FPIF should be used in lieu of other contract types? 
Contracting professionals must take into consideration many procurement aspects 
when determining when FPIF contracts are appropriate, including existing guidance and 
regulations. FAR 16.403 discusses the general application of FPIF contracts, and the 
DFARS and DFARS Procedures, Guidance and Information (PGI) associated with this 
FAR Subpart further clarify circumstances in which FPIF contracts should be used. In 
general, FPIF contracts are appropriate in circumstances where an FFP contract would 
not be suitable, and when the contractor’s assumption of cost responsibility provides a 
positive incentive to control contract cost and performance through the opportunity for 
increased profit margins (FAR [2016] § 16.403). This means FPIF should generally not 
be used in lieu of cost-type contracts for programs in the TD phase or EMD phases of 
their acquisition life cycle, when many of the program efforts will be of an R&D nature 
and costs and requirements are uncertain. USD AT&L Frank Kendall advises that in a 
limited number of EMD phases, FPIF could be appropriate if an MDAP’s requirements 
are stable and mature, technical risk is low, and the competing contractors are both 
experienced and financially capable of assuming risk (2013b). 
DFARS (2016) § 216.403-1(b)(1) directs contracting officers to give particular 
consideration to using an FPIF contract when a program is moving from development to 
the production phase of its life cycle. Indeed, BBP 1.0 stated that FPIF is viewed as being 
most applicable during LRIP and in sole-source production where the government can 
reward year-over-year cost improvements (Carter, 2010b). 
Although FFP is generally the best contract type during full-rate production, there 
may be times when FPIF is a more appropriate choice. DFARS PGI 216.403-1(1)(ii)(B) 
states that it is not in the best interest of the government to use FFP contracts in a 
production phase if costs are not stable, a circumstance further defined as potentially 
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occurring when costs for efforts under previous FFP production contracts have varied by 
more than four percent from the costs that were negotiated at contract award (2016). 
(3) Is current guidance appropriately applied when programs shift contract 
type from FFP to FPIF contract types? 
The PEO Missiles and Space programs we studied that transitioned from FFP to 
FPIF are all in the Operations and Sustainment phase of their life cycle and have been 
producing hardware for many years. All of these programs were previously procuring this 
hardware under FFP contracts. During peer reviews at the ACC Director and OSD DPAP 
levels, these programs were directed to utilize FPIF instead of FFP for the current 
production increment. Although peer review officials seemed to focus on profit 
percentages they deemed excessive, it is important to note that a realized profit rate that is 
higher than what was negotiated indicates that the contractor experienced a cost underrun 
compared to the negotiated cost. As stated in the answer to the previous research 
question, DFARS PGI 216.403-1(1)(ii)(B) guidance indicates that FFP contracts are not 
appropriate during production if costs are not stable, such as when costs for efforts under 
previous FFP production contracts have varied by more than four percent from the costs 
that were negotiated at contract award (2016). Although we did not have access to the 
negotiated profit rates on the previous FFP production contracts, the researchers have 
generally not seen FFP contracts for major weapon systems with negotiated profit rates in 
excess of 15%. Actual realized profit rates of 19% or more would indicate that costs have 
varied by more than four percent from the negotiated costs. Contractors had realized 
profits above 19% on their previous FFP production contracts for all of the studied 
programs that were directed to use FPIF contracts. Therefore, we determine that current 
guidance was appropriately applied when these programs were directed to transition to 
FPIF contracts. 
(4) What benefits has the government realized as a result of the transition 
from FFP to FPIF contracts? 
For the studied programs that switched to FPIF contracts, their transitions 
occurred so recently that none of them have had the opportunity to see completed 
performance of an FPIF contract. Therefore, it is unknown what actual benefits the 
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government will eventually realize as a result of the transition from FFP to FPIF 
contracts. For one program, early cost results indicate that the contractor is currently 
experiencing a profit rate of approximately 20%, which is a substantial decrease from the 
30% actual profit rate the contractor realized on the previous FFP production increment. 
Although contract performance is not complete, this is a positive indicator that the 
contractor is controlling costs and performing efficiently, and that the government may 
realize a cost benefit by using FPIF on this increment of the program. 
Under an FPIF contract, the contractor is required to provide actual data on the 
cost of contract performance at regular intervals. Therefore, the three programs that have 
transitioned to FPIF also receive more actual cost data than contractors previously 
provided to the program office. This cost reporting provides the government with greater 
visibility into the cost of hardware and services it buys and helps inform programmatic 
decisions. Actual cost data will also benefit the government to make appropriate contract 
type decisions for any future production increments. 
Because these programs’ transitions to FPIF were so recent that none have seen 
performance of an FPIF contract through to completion, the researchers were unable to 
study any long-term benefits that the government may realize in the future. 
(5) What challenges or drawbacks result from the use of FPIF contracts? 
All three of the studied programs that have transitioned from FFP to FPIF have 
encountered challenges resulting from the change. All three programs experienced 
lengthy delays in contract negotiations after they received direction to change contract 
type. In some instances, the requirement had been awarded initially as a UCA and the 
contractors were expecting to negotiate FFP contracts. The contractors strongly resisted 
these mid-procurement changes in contract type, resulting in many months of delay in 
providing proposal pricing updates and providing counteroffers, which further delayed 
the negotiation and definitization of those contracts. 
Second, although the receipt and analysis of EVM data has the potential to benefit 
the government, the new requirement to obtain EVM data has been a drawback for the 
studied programs that have transitioned to FPIF. The contractors for these programs were 
 65 
not previously required to submit EVM data because such data was not required for 
previous production increments, which were under FFP contracts. Furthermore, these 
contractors did not currently have systems capable of complying with the requirement, 
and implementing such a system may be expensive. One contractor estimated that its cost 
to submit EVM data would be approximately $500,000 per year. Furthermore, the studied 
programs did not currently employ the necessary personnel with experience to review, 
analyze, and manage this data. One of the studied programs was eventually able to obtain 
approval of a waiver of the requirement after an entire year of effort and routing. The 
other two transitioned programs are also likely to request a waiver of the EVM 
requirement. Therefore, although the provision of EVM data is a theoretical benefit to the 
government, in reality, these programs experienced only negative consequences from the 
requirement. 
In addition, just as the programs did not have personnel with EVM expertise, the 
program offices and the supporting contracting activity both lacked experience with 
negotiating, awarding, and managing FPIF contracts. None of the three program offices 
affected by an FPIF transition have any previous knowledge of FPIF contract 
administration. This lack of experience with the contract type adds further challenge and 
burden to the programs’ implementation of FPIF contracts. 
(6) How do contractors view the DOD’s increased focus on the use of 
incentive contracting? 
We were unable to obtain first-hand data from contractors; however, our literature 
review and the statements from interviewees appear to indicate that the defense industry is far 
less enthusiastic than DOD about incentive contracting and the implementation of the Better 
Buying Power initiatives. It is unsurprising that contractors are generally unwilling to speak 
on the record about their perspectives of DOD profit policy. Other researchers have noted 
that contractors are generally reticent about publicly expressing their views regarding 
profitability of defense contracts because their companies’ livelihoods are significantly 
dependent on receiving DOD contracts; thus, contractors are reluctant to make statements 
that appear to “bite the hand that feeds them” (Gill, 2014, p. 11). 
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Although we were unable to obtain data directly from defense contractors, our 
interviews with personnel supporting PEO Missiles and Space programs revealed that 
contractors reacted negatively to the transition to the FPIF contract type. In all instances 
we studied, contractors have verbalized significant disagreement with the decision to 
switch from FFP to FPIF. They have also tacitly expressed their objections to the change 
in contract type by delaying their responses to the government’s requests for proposal 
pricing updates and counteroffers, causing many months of schedule delay. 
In general, our analysis determined that although industry enjoys a number of 
benefits from government contracting, defense contractors are finding that doing business 
with the DOD is increasingly risky as a result of DOD profit policy. We determined that 
the defense industry realizes lower operating margins compared to industries in other 
sectors, and they perceive that DOD profit policy is an attack on their already middling 
profitability. Reduced profitability leaves contractors less able to invest in innovative 
technologies, high-caliber workforces, or cost efficiencies. These factors may lead them 
to focus less on investing in defense business in favor of more profitable commercial 
opportunities, and some contractors could leave the defense industry altogether, 
threatening the industrial base and the nation’s military capability. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Continue to assess future production increments of acquisition 
programs to determine where FPIF is appropriate 
Although it is too early to draw any final conclusions about the transition to FPIF 
for the programs we studied, we recommend that programs continue to assess future 
production increments to determine whether changing to an FPIF contract is appropriate. 
Although FFP is generally the appropriate contract type when production is at a mature 
stage, DOD guidance and good contracting judgment require programs to assess elements 
such as actual cost data, cost estimating conditions, and production efficiency aspects to 
determine whether it is appropriate to continue using FFP, or whether a switch to FPIF 
would be more advantageous to the government. 
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Related to the recommendation to continue assessing production programs for 
appropriate FPIF use, we recommend that programs, and the DOD officials advising 
them, consider various aspects, in addition to cost and profit, when making contract type 
determination, such as schedule issues, effects on the warfighter, and funding impacts. 
We caution against focusing solely on cost impacts or profit percentages, as making a 
myopic decision can have wider-ranging impacts on non-cost factors. Such instances may 
include 
 Programs should consider whether contracting delays have the potential to 
negatively impact the timing of fielding systems to the warfighter. In such 
cases, the schedule parameter may outweigh seeking what may be a 
comparatively small benefit in contract cost. 
 When an effort is initially awarded as an FFP UCA, programs should 
weigh carefully whether there is much incentive actually available to the 
contractor. If the contractor has purchased a significant amount of 
material, or delivered a large quantity of hardware, their opportunities to 
implement efficiencies and realize cost savings may be greatly reduced. 
When a substantial portion of contract performance is already completed 
before definitization, FPIF may be an inappropriate contract type to 
effectively incentivize the contractor. 
 Programs should consider the timing of incentive determinations and 
related impacts to funding. Several of the programs we studied were in 
peril of having their program funding expire for obligation before the final 
contract price would be determined. Once the funds are expired for 
obligation, the program and warfighter can no longer realize a benefit (the 
funds are returned to the Treasury). 
The government should also consider the contractor’s motivation when 
determining the contract type. By understanding the contractor’s motivation, whether it 
be pure profit, experience or access to technology and future production contracts, the 
government can better tailor the contract type and the associated incentives to meet the 
needs of both parties. 
2. Obtain actual cost data to support future program decisions 
We recommend that DOD acquisition programs obtain actual cost data from 
previous production increments in order to inform future program decisions. While actual 
historical cost data is critical for programs contemplating a shift from FFP to FPIF in 
order to determine the variance between the negotiated costs and the contractor’s incurred 
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costs, obtaining this data is a best practice for any program that is performing cost 
analysis and negotiating a fair and reasonable price based on cost or pricing data. In fact, 
FAR (2016) § 15.404-1(c)(2)(iii), which describes cost analysis techniques, lists 
comparing proposed costs with “actual costs previously incurred by the same offeror” 
first on the list of data to which proposed costs may be compared for reasonableness.  
We believe it is likely that most MDAPs will already be receiving this type of 
actual cost data in the form of Cost and Software Data Reporting (CSDR). DOD 
Instruction 5000.02 requires contractors to provide CSDR submissions for ACAT I and 
IA programs on all major contracts valued at $50 million or more (2015). Because the 
government receives this data as a contract deliverable at regular intervals during contract 
performance, this means some actual cost data is available to inform contract type 
decisions even if the current production increment is not complete. We further 
recommend that programs analyze this data as soon as practicable when planning for the 
next production increment to support proactive and prudent decisions about appropriate 
contract type. Establishing contract type and contractor expectations early may avoid the 
lengthy delays in negotiations like the ones experienced by the programs we studied. 
3. Enhance Army workforce expertise in incentive contracting  
The PEO Missiles and Space program management and contracting professionals 
we interviewed had no prior experience with analyzing, negotiating, or managing FPIF 
contracts. This lack of expertise is not unique to PEO Missiles and Space. A survey 
seeking interview sources within ACC-Warren (whose contracting workforce supports 
PEO GCS and PEO CS&CSS, among other customers) revealed that only five percent of 
contract price/cost analysts had experience negotiating FPIF contracts. We conclude that 
the Army workforce has a marked lack of experience in crafting, negotiating, and 
administering FPIF contracts. 
Our recommendation to enhance Army workforce expertise in incentive 
contracting is twofold: training and sharing of lessons learned. First, we recommend that 
in-depth incentive contracting training be developed and provided by DAU that leverages 
the knowledge of subject matter experts in the field. Local command training programs, 
such as the ACC-Warren Acquisition Education Center, can also expand their incentive 
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contracting training to educate both contracting personnel and the program offices they 
support. Second, we recommend implementing a system for the robust sharing of lessons 
learned from programs and individuals experienced in using incentive contracts. The 
ACC Cost/Price Community of Practice website, which currently provides a repository of 
information that subject matter experts across all ACC locations can access, is a possible 
forum to provide such a capability. Contracting professionals could use this virtual space 
to exchange lessons learned, ideas, and success stories relating to incentive contracting 
topics. 
4. Conduct additional research 
Based upon our research, it is our overall determination that more data is needed 
and future research is warranted on the subject of program impacts resulting from the 
transition from FFP to FPIF type contracts. Although we attempted to cast a wide net, we 
were only able to identify a handful of programs that have transitioned from FFP to FPIF 
within three of the Army’s PEOs for major weapon systems. We based our analyses on 
all data made available to us; however, our sample size was small and our research results 
are not generalizable to the overall population of major defense acquisition programs. 
Therefore, we suggest further research with a larger sample to provide more data points 
and permit further analysis. In addition, because the programs we studied had so recently 
transitioned to FPIF, we recommend future research with programs that have further or 
completed performance to assess the mid- and long-term program impacts of 
transitioning from FFP to FPIF. 
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“1 Goodwill is the value of the name, reputation, location, and intangible assets of the firm. 
2
 Comply with any USD (AT&L), DPAP or other memoranda that have not been incorporated into the 
DFARS or DOD Directives or Instructions” 
Source: Defense Acquisition University (2012). 
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APPENDIX B. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
1. Name of program? 
2. Description of program (hardware, software, services, etc.)? 
3. What is the dollar value of the current contract? 
4. Did the program previously use an FFP contract? 
5. When did the program switch from FFP to FPIF? 
6. What prompted the switch to FPIF? 
7. How many FPIF contracts has the program used? 
8. Has the program realized any benefits from switching to FPIF? 
9. What challenges has the program encountered in using FPIF? 
10. How is contract administration more/less difficult than using FFP? 
11. If possible, quantify the benefit (in dollars) vs. using FFP? 
12. Does the program anticipate receiving benefits that have not yet been 
realized? 
13. If so, what is preventing the program from realizing a benefit currently? 
14. What was the contractor’s reaction to the change in contract type? 
15. What was the contractor’s actual profit rate under previous FFP contracts? 
16. What is the contractor’s actual profit rate since switching to FPIF? 
17. What ACAT level is your program? 
18. When did your program enter FRP? 
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APPENDIX C. INTERVIEW RESULTS 
1. PROGRAM A 




Program A is a product within PEO Missiles and Space. They are an ACAT IC program 
that has technically been in the Operations and Sustainment phase of the life cycle for 
quite some time. Their contracts serve as a mechanism for procuring hardware (mainly) 
and some limited amount of services and ILS from Contractor 1. Due to fluctuating 
requirements, their contracting approach is for a single year procurement. Over the last 
several procurements, each year has been awarded as an Undefinitized Contract Action 




For this program, the transition from FFP to FPIF occurred in 2015. They had awarded 
their FY14 procurement in December 2014 as an FFP UCA. During their OSD Peer 
Review, they were directed by Mr. Assad to change contract type to FPIF. This direction 
came when their Cost and Software Data Reporting (CSDR) Form 1921 data showed a 
realized profit of approximately 30% at both the prime and subcontractor levels on the 
previous contract. Upon flowing this direction to Contractor 1, the contractor notified the 
government that they would have to re-propose, adding six months to the delay. After 
sustaining a 12-month delay, this program successfully definitized their FY14 
procurement as an FPIF contract in the first quarter of FY2016. Currently, they have their 
FY15 and FY16 procurements awarded under UCAs and are working to get these 
awarded as FPIF contracts. 
 
The Pros and Cons 
 
What are the positive aspects of this transition? 
 
 Per the Contracting Officer, they are seeing more cost data that ever 
before. 
 According to OSD analyses, their previous 30% realized profit has 
decreased to an actual profit of approximately 20%. However, all of the 
data has not been submitted to cover the completion of that contracting 
effort. Therefore, this data is incomplete as of today. 
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What are the negative aspects of this transition? 
 
 Six days after contract definitization, the contractor notified the 
government of a cost overrun. 
 Having previously been FFP, Earned Value Management (EVM) data had 
not been required. As an FPIF contract, this was a new requirement, so 
several things came in to play. First, the cost for Contractor 1 to submit 
this data was approximately $500K per year. The government would need 
to have at least two people to review and analyze this data, which they did 
not have. Luckily, after 12 months, Program A was able to obtain a Class 
Waiver, thus eliminating this requirement. 
 To date, all of the work for this contract has not been completed, therefore 
the incentive fee determinations have not been made. However, for an 
FY14 funded requirement, procurement funds will expire on 30 September 
2016. If the contractor has not completed all of their work and submitted 
necessary data for analysis, this funding could expire. DOES THIS MAKE 
THEM ANTI-DEFICIENT SINCE THE FUNDS ARE ALL 
COMMITTED TO THE CONTRACT BUT UNOBLIGATED?? 
 Contractor A presented significant pushback to this transition. However, 
as stated, this contract was awarded as FPIF. 
What are the anticipated benefits of this transition? 
 
 Program A is hoping for a decrease in the profit percentage. Currently, the 
contractor’s cost data shows they are tracking toward a decrease of 
approximately 10%. However, this could change as the contractor still has 
not completed all of the work. 
Table 2.   Program A Impacts of Transitioning from FFP to FPIF 
Impacts of Transitioning from FFP to FPIF 
Program A 
Short Term Mid Term Long Term 
* 12-month schedule slip 
in contract award 
* Seeing more cost data 
than historically 
* Not yet applicable 
* EVM now required * Early indications show a 
decrease in profit 
  
* No previous knowledge 
of FPIF contract 




2. PROGRAM B 




Program B is a product within PEO Missiles and Space. They are an ACAT IC program 
that has technically been in the Operations and Sustainment phase of the life cycle for 
quite some time. This program entered Full Rate Production almost 50 years ago. Their 
contracts serve as a mechanism for procuring hardware from Contractor 2. This particular 
program has a multiyear contract, covering five years (FY12-16). Each year of this 
contract has been awarded as an Undefinitized Contract Action (UCA) due to time 





For this program, the transition from FFP to FPIF occurred in 2016. At this point, all five 
years of the multiyear contract had been awarded until one large ($1B+) UCA. Each year, 
the UCA was amended to add on additional quantities for that year’s procurement 
requirement. During their OSD Peer Review, they were directed by Mr. Assad to change 
contract type to FPIF. This direction came due to lack of CSDR 1921 data that could be 
used to verify that the proposal costs were sufficient. This direction recently occurred and 
Program B is currently waiting on the contractor to submit a pricing update to their 
proposal. At that point, the government will begin negotiations with Contractor 2. Given 
that Contractor 2 has expressed disagreement with the FPIF approach, since a significant 
amount of work has been completed and all the contract deliverables awarded under an 
FFP UCA, it is unknown at this time what further impacts will occur relative to the award 
timeline . 
 
The Pros and Cons 
 
What are the positive aspects of this transition? 
 
 At this time, Program B has been unable to realize any benefits of this 
transition. 
What are the negative aspects of this transition? 
 
 The beginning of negotiations were delayed in order to wait on the 
contractor to submit a pricing update. 
 Having previously been FFP, Earned Value Management (EVM) data had 
not been required. As an FPIF contract, this was a new requirement. At 
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this time, this program does not have personnel with the expertise of 
evaluating and managing this data. It is likely that they will proceed with 
requesting a waiver for this requirement. 
 Program B does not have any experience in managing FPIF type contracts. 
 As explained, this MY contract has been awarded in its entirety as an FFP 
UCA. A good portion of the deliveries associated with this award have 
already been delivered to Program B. Therefore, there is not a clear 
understanding of how it will benefit the government to award as FPIF. 
Additionally, there is no way for Program B to realize savings on expired 
money as any funding removed is already expired for the purposes of 
obligation and cannot be used for other purposes or programs. 
What are the anticipated benefits of this transition? 
 
 Program B is hoping for a decrease in the profit percentage. 
Table 3.   Program B Impacts of Transitioning from FFP to FPIF 
Impacts of Transitioning from FFP to FPIF 
Program B 
Short Term Mid Term Long Term 
* EVM now required * Not yet applicable * Not yet applicable 
* Delay in negotiations      
* No way to realize savings 




* No previous knowledge 
of FPIF contract 




3. PROGRAM C 
 




Program C is a product within PEO Missiles and Space. They are an ACAT IC program 
that has been in the Operations and Sustainment phase of the life cycle for quite some 
time. This program entered Full Rate Production just over 20 years ago. Their contracts 
serve as a mechanism for procuring hardware from Contractor 3. This particular program 




For this program, there has been no transition. During their most recent contract award 
and peer review, concern was expressed early on by OSD that there would be a potential 
recommendation/direction to transition from FFP to FPIF. Program C was able to defend 
their cost analyses with supporting information from the contractor via their CSDR 1921 
data. This proved to be very influential in the review with OSD. This program had a 
realized profit percentage of approximately 15%. 
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4. PROGRAM D 
 




Program D is product within PEO Missiles and Space. They are an ACAT IC program 
that has technically been in the Operations and Sustainment phase of the life cycle for 
quite some time. Their contracts serve as a mechanism for procuring hardware from 
Contractor 4. This particular program has three production contract (FY15-17) for 
hardware only. A drastic change in user requirements resulted in the first year being 




For this program, the direction to make this transition from FFP to FPIF occurred in 
2016. This decision was made at a local level, prior to going to the OSD Peer Review. It 
was the determination of the Director of Army Contracting Command, Redstone Arsenal 
to make this transition. Shortly following this decision, this path forward was briefed at 
the OSD Peer Review and given the support of Mr. Shay Assad. This decision was made 
based upon a few data points. First, this program was not yet receiving CSDR 1921 cost 
data. Second, the pricing analysis showed suppliers were realizing excessively high profit 
percentages. Finally, the pricing analysis showed the prime contract had realized a 30% 
profit percentage previously. Based upon these three points, one might think it a clear cut 
reason for transition from FFP to FPIF for more visibility. However, it was the contention 
of Program D that this realized profit was skewed due to some non-recurring efforts 
being done under this contract type. Additionally, although they did not have CSDR 1921 
data at the time of decision, the data is part of the contract. Currently, negotiations are 
underway for this program, but Contractor 4 has yet to provide a counteroffer in an FPIF 
format and still contends it should be FFP. Therefore, it is not yet known how this will be 
resolved between the two parties. 
 
The Pros and Cons 
 
What are the positive aspects of this transition? 
 
 At this time, Program D has been unable to realize any benefits of this 
transition. 
What are the negative aspects of this transition? 
 
 The beginning of negotiations were delayed in order to wait on the 
government to establish an FPIF offer. 
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 Having previously been FFP, Earned Value Management (EVM) data had 
not been required. As an FPIF contract, this was a new requirement. At 
this time, this program does not have personnel with the expertise of 
evaluating and managing this data. It is likely that they will proceed with 
requesting a waiver for this requirement. 
 Program D does not have any experience in managing FPIF type contracts. 
 Currently, it is the perception of Program D that the ability to realize 
benefits to the warfighter due to any contract underruns will be 
impossible. Currently, this contract is a 3 year contract and the program 
receives procurement funding.   
What are the anticipated benefits of this transition? 
 
 Program D is hoping for a decrease in the profit percentage.   
Table 4.   Program D Impacts of Transitioning from FFP to FPIF 
Impacts of Transitioning from FFP to FPIF 
Program D 
Short Term Mid Term Long Term 
* EVM now required * Not yet applicable * Not yet applicable 
* Delay in negotiations      
* No way to realize 
savings from expired 
funding on UCAs. 
  
  
* No previous knowledge 
of FPIF contract 
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